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Introduction

If we judge our society by the care it provides its most vulnerable

members, we must find it wanting in some respects. This study finds
that much is amiss with the provision and financing of long-term care
for elderly people in the United States with respect to both institutional care in nursing homes and care provided in the home.
In the United States, long-term care is provided in congregate
facilities and in homes. Home care is by provided by individuals
sponsored under home- and community-based service (HCBS) programs financed by Medicaid, a government program financed by the
federal government and the states, and by caregivers, many of whom
are relatives of the persons being cared for and most of whom are
unpaid. The number of elderly persons being cared for at home was
estimated in 2019–2020 to be 52.0 million, dwarfing the 2.9 million
at congregate facilities.
There are three types of congregate facilities in the United States:
nursing homes, which typically offer only semiprivate accommodation (two to a room); assisted living facilities (ALFs), which provide
separate apartments for their residents; and continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs), which provide apartments and homes
for their residents. ALFs and CCRCs cater to an affluent clientele.
Nursing home care is financed largely by Medicaid; however, Medicaid does not finance room and board at ALFs, and plays no role in the
financing of CCRCs.
This study identifies six major weaknesses with the current U.S.
system:
1) Long-term care coverage is severely limited by the stringent
asset and income tests that Medicaid requires for eligibility
for nursing homes and HCBS. As a result, the United States
does not compare well with other countries in its coverage
of the elderly infirm or of their caregivers.
2) Despite their outsized role, caregivers of the elderly at home
receive little governmental support.
1
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3) Basic information on some institutions or parts of the longterm care system is not always timely or comprehensive.
4) Medicaid is complex and hard to understand. Many Americans think long-term care is financed by Medicare, which
covers only short-term stays. This lack of understanding
could leave them unprepared to deal with Medicaid’s stringent eligibility tests if and when they confront the issue of
financing long-term care.
5) Incentives to rectify shortcomings in the care provided by
congregate facilities, especially nursing homes, may be
inadequate.
6) The low wages for paid caregivers are a matter of concern.
The chapters that follow in this book assess long-term care in all
its aspects, not just institutional care. Chapter 1 discusses how the
emergence of nursing homes in the 1930s replaced the poorhouses
that had previously housed the indigent elderly. It then addresses the
introduction of Medicaid in 1965 and its initial bias toward nursing
homes as opposed to care at home. It provides a discussion about the
advent of HCBS and the growth of ALFs and CCRCs. Chapter 1 also
includes a section on paid caregivers.
Chapter 2 considers the financial arrangements governing the
provision of long-term care. In particular, the section on Medicaid
explains how the federal government interacts with the states to
finance both institutionally based care and HCBS, and the criteria that
determine eligibility for Medicaid and share of the costs that it covers.
The chapter also discusses the anemic market for private long-term
care insurance.
Chapter 3 provides a comparative analysis of long-term care in
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). It briefly describes the various models of
provision of long-term care and provides thumbnail sketches of the
way long-term care is delivered and financed in Canada and in Germany, a country that has been cited as a possible model for the United
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States. The Canadian system also has some features that, if adopted,
might increase the coverage and also the public financing of longterm care in the United States. The comparative analysis of Chapter 3
is not flattering to the U.S. system.
Chapter 4 addresses the impact of the pandemic on nursing homes
in the United States and includes some comparison with Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, three other countries for which data
are readily available. The losses in U.S. nursing homes before the
roll-out of vaccination programs in the winter and spring of 2021
were staggering, and were higher than those of the comparator countries, particularly Canada and Germany.
Finally, Chapter 5 sets out a benchmark for a good system. It
compares the U.S. system to it and, as this chapter has already highlighted, finds that the current system falls short of the proposed
benchmark in important respects. Chapter 5 concludes by offering
three possible directions for reform that are progressively more ambitious but also more politically contentious.

Chapter 1

T

A Brief History of
Long-Term Care

he modern history of long-term care in the United States begins
with the establishment of nursing homes as distinct institutions in the
1930s.1 The next major development was the advent of public support for home- and community-based services (HCBS) in the 1970s.
Recent decades have seen the rise in popularity of assisted living
facilities (ALFs), which, unlike nursing homes, are typically private
pay. Continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs), which, like
ALFs, cater to relatively affluent elder Americans began to flourish
in the 1970s, and their numbers have grown substantially since then.
The regulatory role of states and the federal government is greatest for nursing homes and HCBS, but it is more limited for ALFs and
more limited still for CCRCs. Reflecting this difference in the degree
of regulatory oversight, the information available on nursing home
residents and the quality of the care they receive is far greater than
that on the residents in ALFs and CCRCs. The most recent development in long-term care has been moves by several states toward
implementing their own programs of long-term care; Washington
State, for example, has introduced a system that is complementary
to Medicaid.
Studies of long-term care typically focus on the care that is paid
for at least partially by Medicaid, whether provided at nursing homes
or through the community. However, these studies are limited by the
fact that the number of elderly and disabled Americans who are cared
for at home by their families dwarfs the number of elderly Americans
living in one of the three types of congregate institutions (see Table
1.1).
Although some of the elderly living at home with family benefit from Medicaid-financed services, caregivers who are relatives

5
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Table 1.1 Residents in Long-Term Care Institutions and Persons Cared
for at Home
Assisted
Continuing
living
care retirement
Nursing
facilities
communities Persons cared
homes
(ALFs)
(CCRCs)
for at home
Year reported
2019
2019
2020
2020
Residents
1,246,000
812,000
800,000
52,000,000
NOTE: Some of these statistics are quite uncertain. ALFs do not routinely report resident numbers to their state. The CCRC figure is an educated guess, and the figure for
persons being cared for at home is based on a survey.
SOURCE: Nursing homes: Kaiser Family Foundation (2020); ALFs: National Center
for Health Statistics (2019) Table VIII; CCRCs: Various sources; Persons cared for at
home: AARP (2020a) and author’s estimate.

and most other caregivers are almost all unpaid. The total number
of caregivers of adults aged 50 years or older in 2019 has been estimated to be as large as 42 million, and the number of adults they care
for exceeds that number—an estimated 52 million, a number that is
projected to be about 20 times the number in nursing homes, ALFs,
and CCRCs combined.2 Typically, the care recipient is a parent of the
caregiver with an average age of 75. Some 45 percent of care recipients are estimated to have multiple health conditions or disabilities
(AARP 2020a).3
The number of elderly Americans cared for at home is certain
to have grown in 2020–2021 in response to the fear of contracting
COVID-19 in congregate or institutional settings, especially nursing
homes, where occupancy fell by 16 percent between January 2020
and January 2021 (Cottle 2021a). The aging of the baby boom generation will continue to have the same effect. This chapter does not
directly address the history of stay-at-home care, but it is important
to be mindful of the huge role it plays in long-term care. The next
chapter will address the broader economic and financial implications
of unpaid caregiving.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NURSING HOMES
Before the Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935, most disabled or
ill elderly who were not cared for at home were lodged in countyor city-run poorhouses, where conditions were often frightful. A few
may have had the comparatively good fortune of living in homes
that were established for their religious sect or ethnic community,
although even here conditions might be far from luxurious. As Smith
and Feng (2010, p. 2) put it, “Long-term care was, in essence, the last
holdover of the Elizabethan poor-law approach.”4
The Old Age Assistance program of the SSA led to the creation
of the private nursing home industry by providing funds to states that
established residences specifically for the elderly poor while prohibiting funding for residents in poorhouses, a policy that emptied out the
poorhouses, at least of their elderly residents. In 1950, the funds from
Old Age Assistance began to be paid directly to the nursing homes
themselves, rather than to their residents, and nursing homes had to
be certified by their state to be eligible for funding.5 In the mid-1950s,
the Hill-Burton Act provided some funding for the construction of
nursing homes.6
In 1965, Medicare and Medicaid were passed as amendments
to the SSA. Medicare, in addition to providing health insurance for
Americans aged 65+, covers nursing home stays for short-term or
acute care. Medicaid covers long-term stays and unlike Medicare
is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. Initially,
Medicaid covered only the indigent, blind, and disabled. In addition
to being poor, those elderly who were not blind or disabled had to
demonstrate a need for assistance with at least one of the activities of
daily living (ADLs).7 In this respect, it might be said that Medicaid
was perpetuating the poorhouse approach to the care of the elderly.
Medicaid’s provisions are extremely complex. They vary not
only from one state to another, but within states depending on the
programs offered. In addition to institutional services, the states are
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obliged to offer certain home health services to qualifying state residents—namely, part-time or occasional nursing services; home health
aide services; and medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home to qualifying Americans aged 65 or older
(Watts et al. 2020).8
Other services may be provided at the option of the individual
state, and the same state may have different programs covering
essentially the same services. As will be explained in greater detail
in Chapter 2, Medicaid’s coverage was subsequently expanded by
the addition of two pathways to the original pathway established by
the Johnson administration. The complexity of Medicaid’s provisions may partly explain why many Americans believe that long-term
care is covered by Medicare, when actually that program covers only
short-term postsurgical stays and the like.
Medicaid’s initial bias in favor of institutions and against
community-based care has been interpreted as an effort to avoid policies that would entail moral hazard, since a genuine need for home
care is harder to monitor and ascertain than the need for institutionalized care (Smith and Feng 2010).9

THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
NURSING HOMES
The subsequent history of the Medicaid program has been marked
by a series of legislative acts to toughen the oversight and improve
the standard of care in nursing homes. These acts at times have been
enacted in response to publicly voiced concern over the quality of
care in the homes. In 1968, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (subsequently renamed the Department of Health and Human
Services), which had assumed overall responsibility for Medicaid’s
administration, was authorized to set standardized regulations for care
and withhold funding from homes that failed to achieve the stipulated
standards of care.10 The Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 strength-
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ened federal standards, inspections, and enforcement provisions; set
uniform standards for nursing homes funded by either Medicare and
Medicaid; required comprehensive resident assessments; set minimal
requirements for licensed nursing staff; and required inspections to
focus on care outcomes.
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 included requirements for facility quality assurance, performance improvement programs, and compliance and ethics programs. In 2016, the Obama administration acted
to implement these requirements and introduced revamped standards
for the assessment of the quality of care of nursing home residents,
including those related to infection control, facility assessment, and
emergency preparedness. Among other reforms, the 2016 regulations
also revised provisions to give more attention to person-centered care
(i.e., care that is more tailored to individual residents) and the reporting of abuse and neglect. Additionally, the 2016 regulations added
a new section on behavioral health services and required staff competency vetting to determine staffing sufficiency as well as new staff
training requirements. The regulations were implemented in three
phases between 2016 and 2019 (Musumeci and Chidambaram 2020).
The current regulatory framework requires states to oblige certified nursing homes to provide them with a very substantial amount
of information annually on the condition of nursing home residents
and the quality of care they receive, in addition to data on the number of beds, residents, and ownership status and size of homes. Nursing homes must also provide data on the number of their residents
unable to perform any one or more of the six ADLs, as well as data
on basic indicators of health and well-being, such as the incidence of
incontinence, pain, and pressure ulcers (bed sores). This information
is passed on to the federal government and is published by various
agencies.11
Improving both the quality of information regarding various
dimensions of the quality of care in nursing homes and the effectiveness of measures to rectify problems once they are found has been an
ongoing challenge since the beginning of federal and state oversight.
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Over the years, several legislative initiatives whose goals included
these basic objectives have failed to pass through Congress.12
A Summary of Annually Reported Informational Requirements
for Nursing Homes with Some Basic Data
Ownership categories, funding of care, and resident population: In 2015–2016, of the nation’s 15,600 nursing homes, 69 percent
were for-profit, 23 percent were nonprofit private, and 7 percent were
publicly owned (National Center for Health Statistics [NCHS] 2019).
These shares have not varied enormously in the past 20 years. The
nation’s 1.4 million nursing home residents as of the 2016 count had
declined to 1.2 million as of 2019, according to the Kaiser Family
Foundation (2020). Of the total number of residents, 62 percent were
funded by Medicaid, 14 percent by Medicare (for short-term stays),
and 25 percent by private or other sources (Harrington et al. 2018). As
Chapter 4 notes, the number of residents has fallen substantially since
2016 both because of the deaths caused by the COVID-19 pandemic
and decisions by potential residents and their families to opt for home
care or assisted living.
Quality of care: Nursing homes are required to report shortcomings over a comprehensive list of indicators of the quality of care,
considering both the frequency and the severity of the problem. A
finding of a specific problem is known as a health deficiency. Over
the 2005–2014 period, the most cited health deficiencies pertained
to food sanitation, accident prevention, overall quality of care, and
infection control (CMS 2015).13 Depending on the severity and prevalence of deficiencies, a nursing home may lose its state certification. The imposition of such a draconian penalty is rare. In addition
to health deficiencies, nursing homes are required to report instances
of abuse by nursing home aides, be it physical, mental, or emotional.
A recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO
2020) that analyzed data from the Centers for Medicare & Medic-
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aid Services (CMS) for 2013–2017 found that 82 percent of nursing
homes had been cited for an infection control deficiency. About half of
these were cited for one or more consecutive years during this period.
However, only 1 percent of the deficiencies were found to be severe,
in the sense of posing immediate harm to one or more residents.14
Another GAO report (2019) on instances of abuse in the same period
found that although the incidence was low at the beginning of the
period under study, it rose dramatically over the five years. The report
also found that information on the type of abuse or its perpetrator was
not readily available; therefore, it is fair to conclude that although
reporting of health deficiencies is adequate, follow-up appears to be
lacking, and the situation for abuse is likely much worse.

THE ADVENT OF HOME- AND COMMUNITY-BASED
SERVICES
In the 1970s, efforts began to authorize the use of federal funds
for noninstitutional HCBS. In 1970, Medicaid funds could be used for
the first time to finance noninstitutional care for the elderly with functional disabilities if those deficiencies would qualify them for nursing
home residence (Iezzoni, Gallopyn, and Scales 2019). The SSA was
amended to permit federal grants to states for social services programs
such as homemaker services, adult day care, and health support.15 In
1975, amendments to the SSA created Title XX, which consolidated
federal assistance to states for social services into a single grant, giving states more flexibility in the allocation of the funds across different programs under the general rubric of HCBS while requiring states
to prevent or reduce inappropriate institutional care by providing for
these at-home services.
Potential problems with moral hazard aside, home care should
in principle impose less of a burden on public finances than institutionalized care, because the beneficiaries of home care remain in
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their homes, sparing the federal government and the states the cost
of lodging and feeding them. One study has found that states with
established HCBS programs achieved lower costs than other states
(Kaye, LaPlante, and Harrington 2009). Medicaid expenditure on
HCBS began to grow significantly in the 1980s, but waiting lists for
the optional HCBS that states offer have lengthened because states
can limit the number of persons eligible for the programs offered.16
The Americans with Disabilities Act, enacted in 1990, emphasized the importance of integrating people with disabilities into the
community and ending exclusion and segregation. Another step was
the creation of the Money Follows the Person demonstration program, which aimed to support state efforts to rebalance their longterm services and supports system to emphasize HCBS by giving
individuals a choice of where they live and receive services. From the
program’s authorization in 2005 until 2021, states transitioned more
than 100,000 people to community living, amounting to about 7 percent of the number of nursing home residents as of 2008. About onethird of those transitioned were elderly persons; the rest were disabled
younger persons. In addition to its obvious benefits for the individuals who returned to the community, the program has saved Medicaid
money (Gottlich 2021).
The Affordable Care Act provided additional choices to states
aimed at encouraging the improvement of their long-term care infrastructures and expanding HCBS. Its provisions included an extension
of the Money Follows the Person program. In addition, for the fiveyear period beginning January 1, 2014, states were required to apply
spousal impoverishment standards—which had been introduced earlier to avoid the impoverishment of the spouses of persons needing
institutionalized care—in determining eligibility for married Medicaid applicants receiving HCBS. Prior to this, these standards were
applied only to the spouses of nursing home residents.17
The number of elderly Americans benefiting from adult day service centers, which is one component of HCBS, was about 300,000
in 2016 (NCHS 2019), with Medicaid financing about two-thirds of
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the total cost. By way of comparison, home health agencies—which
numbered 12,200 in 2015–2016, and which are almost entirely
financed by private health and/or long-term care insurance—had
about 4.5 million users in 2016 as measured by the number of patients
discharged in that year (NCHS 2019). A substantial share of expenditure on HCBS goes to paying for home visits by doctors and other
medical personnel, as well as visits by aides who assist with ADLs.
As of fiscal year 2018 (fiscal years end on September 30 of the year
stated), the states provided HCBS to about 620,000 elderly persons
under their basic Medicaid obligation. An additional 4.2 million benefited from optional programs (Watts, Musumeci, and Chidambaram
2020).18 With the increased emphasis on HCBS, the share of Medicaid’s budget going to institutional care has declined; spending on
HCBS surpassed spending on institutional care for the first time in
2013. In 2016, it comprised 57 percent of total Medicaid Long-Term
Services and Supports spending (Watts, Musumeci, and Chidambaram 2020).
In addition to paying for in-home visits by doctors and other
providers of medical services, a state’s Medicaid program may also
pay for the services of certain family and non-family members who
assist Medicaid-eligible persons with ADLs. In most states, spouses
of eligible persons may not be employed in this capacity, but divorced
spouses may. Rates of remuneration vary from state to state but are
generally at the minimum wage level. Data on the relative roles of
paid and unpaid caregivers are not readily available, although it
appears that the great majority of these caregivers’ time is unpaid
(AARP 2020a).19
A discussion of HCBS should not conclude without a reference
to the Programs for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE). PACE
began as a single center in San Francisco’s Chinatown in the early
1970s aimed at providing home services to older adults who qualified
for institutional care but with adequate care could avoid being institutionalized. The original day care center began receiving Medicaid
payments in 1974. Under the program, each participant benefits from
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care by a multidisciplinary team. The PACE model gradually spread
across the country, with each organization acting as a separate nonprofit covering a particular geographical area at a single physical site.
In 1990, the first PACE programs received Medicare and Medicaid
waivers to operate. By 2019, 130 PACE organizations were operational in 31 states and were serving over 50,000 participants (National
Pace Association, n.d.). A fixed sum is paid for each participant,
which allows participants to benefit from services not covered under
Medicaid’s fee-for-service approach. PACE is an optional program
under Medicaid: that is, states are not required to offer it.

ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES
The total number of ALFs in the United States as of 2019 is estimated to be nearly 29,000, with a capacity of about one million beds
and number of residents about 812,000 (NCHS 2019). The average
number of residents per facility was 28, compared with 86 at the
nation’s nursing homes. Some 57 percent of the nation’s ALFs are
chain-affiliated (i.e., related to a group of facilities under the same
ownership) (NCHS 2019).
Assisted living centers cater to more affluent elderly people than
nursing homes do and are intended for those elderly who want the
privacy of their own apartment but typically cannot perform all the
ADLs. Apartment units normally have a small kitchen area with a
fridge and a microwave for snacks and reheated meals, but meals are
usually served in a communal dining room. The residents in ALFs do
tend to need less assistance with the ADLs than nursing home residents, and many residents in ALFs may be quite mobile. For example, in 2015–2016, only one in five residents in ALFs and similar
residential care communities needed assistance with eating, compared with 6 in 10 nursing home residents. Ninety percent or more
of nursing home residents needed assistance with one or more of the
other ADLs, compared with 40–60 percent of residents in ALFs and
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other care communities. However, ALFs usually also include what is
known as a memory unit for residents suffering from Alzheimer’s or
other dementias, and some 42 percent of residents were diagnosed
with one of these conditions, not far below the 48 percent of nursing
home residents with that diagnosis (NCHS 2019).
Although residents in ALFs have more living space than the
typical nursing home resident, ALFs are less expensive than nursing homes. In 2020, the nationwide median annual cost of a private
one-bedroom unit in an ALF was estimated to be $48,000, compared
to about $93,000 for a semiprivate unit in a nursing home (American
Health Care Association/National Center for Assisted Living 2021).
The ALF estimate, however, does not include charges for such extra
services as the supply and monitoring of medications, which can
exceed $1,000 per month.
A comparison of the make-up of the labor force at ALFs and
nursing homes may help explain part of the difference in the cost of
the two types of institutions. At nursing homes, nurses at all levels of
training accounted in 2016 for 34 percent of the full-time equivalent
labor force; at ALFs they make up 16 percent (NCHS 2019, Table
VI). Aides, mostly unskilled and low-paid, account for a correspondingly higher percentage of the full-time equivalent labor force at
ALFs. The average hourly wage earned by certified nursing assistants
is about $14 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021). Cottle (2021b) implies
that this rate is on a par with the wage paid by Chipotle, the fast-food
chain, and it is certainly less than what a nurse would receive.
Similar to the regulation of nursing homes, the regulation of
ALFs is split between the federal and state governments. The federal
government’s involvement is exercised through Medicaid. Although
Medicaid does not cover room and board, it may cover personal care
services for residents who would be eligible for Medicaid were they
eligible for Medicaid coverage in a nursing home.
Ideally, Medicaid should ensure that the elderly and disabled
receive care in the setting most appropriate for their needs. An estimated 48 percent of ALFs are Medicaid-certified to be home and
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community-based service providers, and about 17 percent of ALF
residents rely on Medicaid to cover some aspect of the cost of their
daily care. Although most states offer Medicaid coverage of assisted
living services, each state administers its Medicaid programs and has
some latitude in the programs it will cover, so that beneficiary eligibility criteria and provider participation range from very limited to
robust. In any case, Medicaid does not cover room and board, so it
plays a relatively minor role in paying for part of the total cost of
residence at an ALF, with less than one in five residents at ALFs being
covered even in part by Medicaid in 2016. As a result, ALFs will be
beyond the means of most elderly Americans.
The financial arrangements of ALF residents are comparatively
straightforward. A new resident enters into a rental agreement with
the facility, with a term that is typically month to month. However,
residents typically have no legal protection from a decision by the
facility not to renew an expiring lease, and there are no limits on rate
increases. In practice, it is likely that the lease of a resident will be
renewed unless the ALF decides that it is no longer capable of caring
for that resident because of a deterioration in their medical condition.
As we shall see in Chapter 4, the greater privacy that residents at
ALFs enjoy has held down substantially the total deaths caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic in these facilities compared to nursing homes.
However, a full picture has yet to emerge because, as of mid-2020,
the latest date for which data are available, less than half of the states
were reporting COVID-19-related deaths in ALFs.

CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES
In the early 1980s, when the first thorough analysis of CCRCs
was published (Winklevoss and Powell 1984), there were about 275
such facilities in the country, with about 70,000 residents. Industry sources have reported that the precursors to these communities
date back to the early twentieth century, when religious and other
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groups established them for their members, who typically financed
their membership by selling their homes (GAO 2010). The number
of CCRCs has now grown to nearly 2,000, and the number of their
residents is believed to number about 600,000 (AARP 2019). As their
name suggests, CCRCs provide residents with services that range
from separate apartments or stand-alone dwellings with community
amenities, often quite luxurious, for those residents who live independently, to assisted living facilities for members needing help with
one or more of the ADLs, to the services of a nursing home. The
basic appeal of a CCRC is precisely that residents can in principle be
assured of exactly the level of care they need without having to move
elsewhere. Consequently, stays at CCRCs may be quite long in comparison with ALFs, particularly if the resident of an ALF is deemed to
require care that the facility is incapable of providing.
One issue that crops up with any attempt to study or report on
CCRCs is the paucity of basic data on their operations. Even the figure just given for the total number of their residents is an educated
guess. The lack of data is most likely due to the fact that there is no
federal regulatory framework, and that only 38 states have imposed a
regulatory framework of any kind on them. The absence of data may
be of less importance than it would be for nursing homes because
residents at CCRCs are more affluent than the general population in
their age group, are in better health, and are likely better able to advocate for themselves. Nonetheless, CCRCs involve some potentially
serious financial risks for their residents.
Most CCRCs have three basic payment arrangements, plus a
pay-as-you-go rental arrangement. These arrangements each involve
a large entrance fee plus an ongoing monthly fee. The difference
among them depends on the treatment of health-related expenditure.
The largest up-front fee applies when the monthly fee is not affected
by the level of health care the resident needs. Once a person becomes
a member of a CCRC requiring an up-front payment, she cannot be
asked to leave if her health deteriorates, although depending on the
contract she signed upon entering the community, her monthly fee
may rise.

18 Mackenzie

In 2019, the entry fee for the CCRCs that have one, which represent close to two-thirds of the total, was an estimated $329,000, plus
a monthly maintenance or service fee of $2,000–$4,000. The monthly
rent for the remaining CCRCs was estimated at about $3,000–$6,000
(AARP 2019).
The financial arrangements of CCRCs are complex, essentially
because by accepting someone as a member, the CCRC is committing
to ensure care at an appropriate standard for the rest of the member’s
life. It is thus taking on a complex contingent liability, because neither a resident’s length of life nor the quality of care he may need is
predictable. The implications of this commitment and the regulatory
challenges it poses are explored further in Chapter 2.

THE LONG-TERM CARE PAID LABOR FORCE
The provision of long-term care is a labor-intensive business.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Division of Occupational Employment Statistics, in May 2020 some 4.6 million persons were employed as direct care workers in nursing homes, other
congregate settings, and in the provision of care in community centers
and homes. Direct care workers, as the language suggests, provide
basic care to elderly and disabled persons in the performance of the
basic ADLs as well as other duties. They are normally classified in
one of three occupational groups: home health aides, personal care
aides, and nursing assistants.20 There is, however, considerable overlap in their duties. They work in one of three settings: private homes;
congregate settings, including ALFs and group houses; and nursing
homes (see Table 1.2).
Nursing assistants, most of whom work in nursing homes, assist
residents with ADLs but may also perform basic clinical duties (like
monitoring blood pressure) under the supervision of a nurse. Home
health aides and personal care aides work in the home, community
centers, and the other congregate settings noted. The sector also
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Table 1.2 The Direct Care Workforce in 2020 (in thousands)
Home care workers
2,400
Residential care aides
675
Nursing assistants in nursing homes
527
Subtotal
3,602
Direct care workers in other industries
Total

998
4,600

SOURCE: PHI (2021).

employs professionally certified staff, of which the largest single
occupational group would be registered and practical nurses, as well
as doctors and nonmedical professional staff, such as accountants and
business analysts.
The three groups are quite similar in their demography: the vast
majority are women and persons of color (see Table 1.3). In addition,
about 15 percent are non-U.S. citizens (PHI 2021). Hourly wages are
low, and median annual incomes are very low compared with average median incomes for the nation’s workforce. Part of the reason
for this is that many direct care workers work less than a 35-hour
week, which makes them part time. Surveys imply that the typical
Table 1.3 Basic Characteristics of the Direct Care Workforce, 2020
Home care Residential Nursing home
workers
care aides
assistants
Number (000s)
2,400
675
527
Demographic (% of total workforce)
Women
86
81
91
Persons of color
63
53
58
With at least one minor child
23
26
31
Median age
47
37
38
Economic (% of total workforce)
Working part time
42
23
24
Share without health insurance
17
17
13
Median hourly wage ($)
12.98
13.45
14.48
Median annual income ($)
18,100
22,200
24,200
SOURCE: PHI (2021).
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reason for this is “noneconomic,” such as poor health or the need to
look after children. Home care workers stand out from the other two
groups in two respects: their median age is distinctly higher, as is the
share who work part time (see Table 1.3). The higher share of home
care workers on part-time schedules helps explain the gap between
their annual income and that of the other two groups. The educational
attainment of the three groups is similar: about half have no more than
high school education.
It is important to note that the estimate of the number of home
care workers shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 does not include home care
workers who are directly employed by the “consumer”—the recipient
of the care under Medicaid’s consumer-directed programs. PHI, an
advocacy group for direct care workers and the source for the data
shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, estimates that these workers may number 1.2 million, but recognizes that the indirect source of its estimate
makes it uncertain (PHI 2021).
In light of the low average incomes of direct care workers, it
is not surprising that all three classes tend to reply on public assistance in one form or another (see Table 1.4). That reliance does vary
somewhat across the three groups, but for all three it is significant.
Equally striking is the share of direct care workers who are members
of a household that lives below two times the poverty line. Moreover,
Table 1.4 Indicators of Poverty in the Direct Care Workforce, 2020
(% of group population)
Home care Residential Nursing home
workers
care aides
assistants
Living in a household with income:
1) Below the poverty line
16
13
12
2) Below 2x the poverty line
45
40
41
Receiving some form of public
53
38
34
assistancea
Medicaid, food, and nutrition (e.g., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or
cash).
SOURCE: PHI (2021).
a
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more than 1 in 10 households with a direct care worker live below the
poverty line (Table 1.4).
A recent issue brief from the Kaiser Family Foundation (Musumeci, Amula, and Rudowitz 2021) goes beyond the numbers to address
the difficulties encountered by both the direct workforce and unpaid
family workers. The brief reports on the results of a focus group
exercise organized by the Kaiser Family Foundation in the summer
of 2021. By its nature, a focus group exercise cannot be deemed to
be representative of whole populations. Nonetheless, the sentiments
and views reported in this brief are similar to those reported by other
sources, including PHI (2020).
Unsurprisingly, direct care workers believe that they are underpaid for the physical and mental demands of their work, although
at the same time they take pride in the work they do. Shift workers
complain of unpredictable changes in their hours, which were aggravated by the pandemic. Some members of the groups reported that,
while they received training at the employer’s expense, they did not
benefit from wage increases as a result, nor was there any kind of
career ladder.21
Medicaid payments to nursing homes and to those home care
workers who are paid by Medicaid’s HCBS programs appear to put
a ceiling on the wages that their direct care workers receive. In spite
of reported labor shortages, there has been no increase in real wages,
which have in fact declined.22 The demand for home care workers is
expected to grow more rapidly than the demand for personal care and
nursing aides, in part because of the momentum of the aging in place
movement, which has been given a boost by the impact of the pandemic on the perceived attractiveness of nursing homes.23 Whether
this will lead to any increase in the wages of home care workers is
uncertain.
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THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS’
LONG-TERM CARE PROGRAM
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has its own program of
long-term care for qualifying veterans.24 In addition to a retirement
pension payable after 20 years of service, there are three classes of
benefit for older veterans: the VA Pension, the Aid and Assistance
Benefit, and the Housebound Benefit. They have a common service
requirement, as well as a common limit on net worth, which in 2021
was $130,773. The VA’s measure of net worth includes a measure
of income that consists of salary and related compensation, Social
Security benefits, and any other pension benefits. The value of a permanent residence, one vehicle, and certain other real assets that are
part of a house are excluded from the limit. A three-year look-back
period applies to discourage transfers of assets within three years of
an application for benefits.
To qualify for a VA Pension, a veteran must satisfy one of the
following four criteria: 1) be age 65 or older; 2) have a total and permanent disability; 3) be a patient in a nursing home receiving skilled
nursing care; or 4) receive Social Security Disability Insurance or
Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
The value of the VA pension is determined by the difference
between the maximum annual pension rate (MAPR), which is set
by Congress, and countable income, from which nonreimbursable
medical expenses may be deducted. The MAPR depends on the number of a veteran’s dependents and his or her marital status. Through
November 30, 2021, the MAPR for a single veteran was $13,931, and
for a married vet or a vet with one dependent, $18,243. The actual
payment, which is made monthly, cannot exceed the MAPR, and is
reduced to zero if countable income exceeds the MAPR. In 2017, it is
estimated that 637,000 vets were receiving the VA pension for at least
one month of that year, with a median monthly payment of $1,087
(Giefer and Loveless 2021).
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The Aid and Assistance Benefit is made to veterans who require
the services of a paid caregiver for ADLs, are bedridden, live in a
nursing home and are physically or mentally incapacitated, or have
significantly poor eyesight. The Housebound Benefit is made to veterans who have significant difficulty leaving their residence because
of a permanent disability. Each of these benefits has a MAPR, which
is higher than the VA benefit. For a single vet with no dependents the
combined VA and Aid and Assistance Benefit was $23,238; for a married vet or a vet with a single dependent, the benefit was $27,549. The
Housebound Benefit falls between the VA benefit and the combined
benefit.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROVISION OF
LONG-TERM CARE AT THE STATE LEVEL
In recent years, six states have explored the idea of a program that
would provide their residents with some or all the services that Medicaid now provides. Washington State, in fact, has implemented such
a program. In 2019, Washington’s state legislature passed a program
that provides qualifying residents up to $100 per day in support for
up to one year, or a total lifetime maximum of $36,500 as a bridge
to support from Medicaid. Washington’s program does not require
that residents meet the income and asset tests that Medicaid imposes,
which are described in Chapter 2. Medical grounds for eligibility are
the same as those that apply with the state’s Medicaid program. The
program is financed by a payroll tax of 0.58 percent on all employees including the self-employed. In addition to helping residents aged
65 and older, the program reduces the cost to the state of its share
of Medicaid expenses that it would otherwise incur. The program is
vested and requires a certain period of contributions, among other
conditions, before a resident may become eligible. Full program
implementation is scheduled to begin in January 2025, with premium
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collection beginning in January 2022. Washington State’s program
will ease both the burden of those of its residents who require either
institutional or home-based care, as well as the burden of Medicaid
on the state’s finances.
The other five states (California, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, and
Minnesota) are still developing their policies. Hawaii, the furthest
along of the five, has reached what has been described as the preoperational stage (Cohen et al. 2020). Taken as a group, these states
are relatively progressive in the sense that their social policy programs tend to be better developed than those of many other states. It
is uncertain whether other states will follow their example.25
Notes
1. This chapter draws heavily on Kaiser Family Foundation (2015), as well
as the other sources noted. This account is not exhaustive, but rather
seeks to highlight the thrust of legislative initiatives to establish and
broaden the coverage and the quality of long-term care. Private longterm care insurance, which can pay for either institutional or at-home
care is discussed in Chapter 2. As a historical aside, the origin of organized social welfare programs can be found in the pension program
established for Civil War veterans in the 1870s. In the 1880s, the administration of the program was moved to Washington’s magnificent Pension Building, which is now home to the National Building Museum.
Lepore (2018), however, traces the dawn of organized social welfare
even further back, to the establishment of support by states of the Confederacy for the widows of Confederate soldiers.
2. An estimated 76 percent of caregivers of adults are responsible for one
person, with 24 percent caring for two or more (AARP 2020a). The calculation presented in the text assumes that the 24 percent who care for
more than one care for exactly two adults.
3. AARP (2020a) presents survey results for caregiving in general. AARP
(2020b) addresses caregiving for adults aged 50+. The two publications
report the same figures for recipients of care aged 50+.
4. According to Smith and Feng (2010), roughly 2 percent of the elderly
population were housed in either local poorhouses or state psychiatric
hospitals prior to the establishment of the SSA. As of 2016, the share
of the population aged 65+ who resided in nursing homes is estimated
to have been about 2.5 percent. The figures are not strictly comparable,
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5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

11.
12.

because the figure for nursing homes does not include elderly persons in
long-term psychiatric facilities.
The Poor Relief Act of 1601, passed by the English parliament during
the reign of Elizabeth I, provided that local authorities (parishes) were
to care for the aged, the blind, and those unable to work in an almshouse
or a poor house.
Private boarding houses tended to reemerge as for-profit nursing homes—
a sector that continues even today to serve a larger proportion of the poor
elderly population than do nonprofit homes (Smith and Feng 2010).
In his classic work Asylums, Goffman (1961) includes homes for the
aged among what he terms “total institutions.” Although his examples
are mainly drawn from mental hospitals and prisons, his characterization of a total or closed institution: regimentation, tight scheduling, and
doing the same thing every day with the same people in the same places,
is unsettling in the way it pinpoints key features of nursing homes then
and now.
The six ADLs are 1) bathing, 2) toileting, 3) eating, 4) transferring in
and out of bed, 5) being mobile, and 6) dressing and undressing.
States have the option of offering the following additional home health
services: physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech pathology
and audiology services.
Strictly speaking, moral hazard may not be the most accurate term.
It normally refers to the tendency for insurance of a contingency to
encourage behavior that makes the contingency more likely. For example, moral hazard occurs with life insurance if insured persons take up
hang gliding or engage in other risky behavior. Here it is essentially
referring to the possibility that persons who do not really qualify for
home care may falsely claim that they do—that is, dishonesty.
In the 1980s, some states made their Medicaid nursing home eligibility
and screening policies more stringent to reduce demand for beds. At
least 30 states instituted formal preadmission screening programs for
Medicaid nursing home placements in the 1980s to ensure that services
were needed; this became mandatory with the adoption of the 1987
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) nursing home reform legislation (Harrington et al. 1992).
These agencies include MACPAC (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and
Access Commission), CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services), and the NCHS.
In particular, the 1988 Long-Term Care (LTC) Assistance Act, the 1988
Life-Care LTC Protection Acts, the 1990 Pepper recommendations, and
the 1993 Clinton Health Security Act never made it out of Congress.
The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports program
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13.

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

was passed as part of the Affordable Care Act. It was designed to be a
publicly administered voluntary program of long-term insurance, but
doubts about its financial viability contributed to opposition leading to
its repeal in 2013.
National Center for Health Statistics (2019) appears to have the most
comprehensive data on the number of nursing homes by type of ownership, beds, and the survey information discussed in the previous section.
The latest years for which data are available are 2015–2016, although
data on the number of residents through 2019 is available from other
sources. The Nursing Home Data Compendium (2015) covers the
2005–2014 period (see CMS 2015).
Infection prevention and control deficiencies cited by surveys can
include situations where nursing home staff did not regularly use proper
hand hygiene or failed to implement preventive measures during an
infectious disease outbreak, such as isolating sick residents and using
masks and other personal protective equipment to control the spread of
infection.
In 1965, Congress had already passed the Older Americans Act (OAA)
in response to concerns about a lack of community social services for
older persons. The original legislation established authority for grants to
states for community planning and social services, research and development projects, and personnel training in the field of aging. The law
also established the Administration on Aging (AOA) to administer the
newly created grant programs and to serve as the federal focal point
on matters concerning older persons. Today the OAA is considered an
important albeit not the only institution for the organization and delivery of social and nutrition services to this group and their caregivers.
The OAA also promotes community service employment for poor older
Americans; training, research, and demonstration activities in the field
of aging; and activities that protect the rights of the vulnerable elderly
(Administration for Community Living, n.d.). The act was last reauthorized in 2020.
Gleckman (2020) argues that a large number of people are in nursing
homes because they cannot obtain the home-based services they need
from their state, not that they really need the services provided by a
nursing home.
Spousal impoverishment safeguards are explained in Chapter 2, on
Medicaid financing.
The figure for the total number of persons benefiting from optional programs reflects some double-counting, because one person may be receiving benefits under a state program and a Medicaid waiver program.
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19. The role of family caregivers is uncertain. Many states, under the Home
and Community Based Services State Plan Option allow relatives to be
hired by the care recipient. However, only 14 states allow a spouse as
caregiver, so that usually an adult child would be paid by Medicaid, if at
all. These plans are entitlement plans, meaning that any recipient of care
is in principle eligible. Another program, the Community First Choice
Program, allows persons who need nursing-home levels of care to get
that care at home. Some nine states have adopted this program. Two
other programs for consumer-directed care—HCBS Medicaid Waivers and Section 1115 Demonstration Waivers—exist, but these give the
states the right to restrict the number of recipients and the relationship
of the family caregiver as well as the area of the state in which the program is available.
20. Personal care aides provide other household assistance and assistance
to individuals who want to remain a part of their communities. Home
health aides (and in some cases, nursing assistants) may perform certain
clinical tasks under the supervision, which may be remote, of a licensed
professional.
21. The training might be online or in-person and included topics such as
safe lifting practices, allergy management, and tracheotomy and gastrointestinal tube care (for nursing aides).
22. The median nominal wage per hour for direct care workers increased
from $12.56 to $13.56 between 2010 and 2020, or by 8 percent. Consumer prices actually increased by 17.2 percent (PHI 2021).
23. The aging in place movement has as its principal goal keeping people
in their own homes and out of congregate institutions for as long as
possible.
24. This section is based on A Place for Mom (n.d.), and Department of
Veteran Affairs (n.d., 2021).
25. The vesting and residency requirements of Washington’s program
would discourage in-migration of non-state residents seeking to benefit
from the new program.

Chapter 2

How Care Is Financed
MEDICAID

Medicaid is a program for poor, or relatively poor, elderly (aged

65+ years) and disabled Americans.1 It is financed jointly by the federal government and the states from general tax revenues, and in this
respect differs radically from Medicare, which is financed by payroll
taxes, levies by the federal government on taxpayer incomes exceeding certain thresholds, and the premiums paid by persons aged 65+.
This chapter’s principal focus is on Medicaid’s role in the financing
of long-term care for people aged 65+, but although persons benefiting from long-term care services and supports amounted to just 5.5
percent of Medicaid beneficiaries in fiscal year 2019, they accounted
for close to one-third of Medicaid expenditure (Rudowitz et al. 2021).
Medicaid provides a guarantee of federal payments to match state
expenditure and is open-ended in the sense that it has no preset limit;
that is, any person who satisfies the eligibility requirements set by the
federal government—or, in the case of certain services, by the states
that have opted to provide the services—is covered. With Medicare
and Social Security, however, the rules that determine eligibility are
the same nationwide. With Medicaid, although states are required to
offer certain services to be eligible for federal support, the rules for
other services may vary from state to state, even within a state, and
are determined by the states themselves. Much of the complexity of
Medicaid’s financial arrangements stems from its joint ownership
by the two levels of government and by the critical role played by
means-testing in determining eligibility. Means-testing plays no role
in either Medicare or Social Security.2
The share of a state’s Medicaid expenditure paid by the federal
government varies according to a formula under which the share var-
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ies with a state’s relative per capita income. The minimum share is
50 percent of combined federal and state expenditure, and the maximum is 77 percent as of 2021.3 The minimum a state receives from
the federal government is thus one dollar for each dollar the state
itself spends. The share paid by the federal government applies to
both the programs that the state is obliged to provide (nursing homes
and that part of HCBS that is required under Medicaid’s terms, as
discussed in Chapter 1), as well as optional HCBS programs. The
federal-state sharing arrangement has led some of its critics to argue
that the states effectively overspend, on the grounds that the marginal
benefit of extra expenditure to a state is less than its total marginal
cost. These critics contend that a block grant arrangement—where the
federal government pays each state a lump sum—would be preferable, because any expansion of benefits beyond the block grant would
be entirely financed by the state.4 However, growing income inequality, which is linked to worsening health as well as increasing health
costs, have undoubtedly pressured states to spend more on Medicaid.
Medicaid provides special match rates for the Affordable Care
Act’s Medicaid expansion, and for administration and other services.
A state may also receive a higher percentage for certain services or
populations. Medicaid also provides disproportionate share hospital payments to hospitals serving many Medicaid and uninsured
patients.5 The Medicaid expansion that took place under the Affordable Care Act is financed primarily with federal dollars and accounts
for a relatively small share of total Medicaid spending. As of April
2021, 12 states continued to opt out of the expansion of Medicaid
under the Affordable Care Act, despite the small share of the additional cost they bear.
Notwithstanding Medicaid’s cost-sharing arrangements, state
spending on Medicaid as a whole amounted to about $225 billion in
FY 2019, which is a sizeable share of state tax revenues. In an effort
to reduce the burden that their share of the cost of Medicaid entails,
states have reduced the coverage of HCBS programs or reduced
expenditure per capita on these programs and the services they are
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obliged to provide under Medicaid. Enrollment tends to increase during recessions, when states’ revenues are declining and tends not to
reverse that increase with economic recovery, which adds to the pressure on states to hold down expenditure per capita.

ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID’S INSTITUTIONAL AND
HCBS COVERAGE6
The share of the population that is eligible for Medicaid has grown
substantially in recent years. Originally, its coverage was restricted to
aged, disabled, and blind persons who had qualified for SSI, which
was 74 percent of the federal poverty line. The growth in coverage
reflects both the inclusion of additional elements of the population
and the adoption of less restrictive but certainly not generous means
tests. In the 38 states and D.C. that have now opted to participate in
the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid in 2015, virtually all
state residents whose incomes do not exceed $17,775 per year as of
2021 (which was 138 percent of the federal poverty level for a single
person) are covered at the state’s option.
Medicaid relies on an income test as well as an asset test to determine eligibility for both health care and long-term care.7 The income
and asset limits included in the original legislation apply to what is
known as the Aged, Blind, and Disabled pathway, which covers the
original group to be eligible for Medicaid. The original income limit
equaled 74 percent of the federal poverty line, but some states have
the option to increase the limit up to 100 percent. The income test
excludes income from government programs, as well as a small part
of earned income.8 As of 2018, the monthly income limit for all 50
states and D.C. ranged from $528 in Connecticut to $1,164 in Hawaii
for an individual, with a median value of $750, and from $696 to
$1,578 for a couple, with a median value of $1,125. In about half of
the states, the limit for a single person fell to between $700 and $800
(Musumeci, Chidambaram, and O’Malley Watts 2019).9
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The asset limit for an individual ranged from $1,500 in New
Hampshire to $7,560 in Arkansas, and for a couple, from $1,500 in
New Hampshire to $11,340 in Arkansas. Most states impose a limit
of $2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples. The limits appear to
be low, but they exclude the value of an applicant’s primary residence
(up to a value of $560,000, or as much as $840,000 at the option
of the state), one automobile, and personal property and household
belongings.10 These exclusions effectively make the asset test a limit
on financial assets, not real assets, for most older Americans. The
treatment of retirement plan balances under the asset test varies from
state to state: a few states exclude them entirely. Warshawsky and
Marchand (2017) estimate that in 2010, some 71 percent of retirement
plan assets were countable toward Medicaid asset tests.
For older Americans in need of long-term care, two other pathways to Medicaid eligibility are available that broaden the program’s
coverage considerably. The first of these is the special income rule,
under which 42 states and D.C. have chosen to increase the income
limit to three times the standard payment for the SSI, or three times
$794 or $2,382 per month in 2021. An asset test that for most states
is similar to the test for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled pathway also
applies.11 The income limit of the special income rule is considerably
higher than the limit applying under the original program and also
higher than the limit that may be applied by states that opted for the
Affordable Care Act’s expansion of coverage, and three of every four
Americans aged 65 years and older are residents in states that offer
this pathway.12
The second pathway of eligibility is the medically needy pathway, which provides some coverage for applicants whose medical
expenses take up a large share of their income. Thirty-four states
have opted for this program, 26 of which have chosen also to apply
the special income pathway.13 Its income test is based on a monthly
income limit that each state sets. Applicants whose income exceeds
that limit are not eligible through this pathway unless they are able to
show that they have incurred medical expenses that equal or exceed
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the difference between their current monthly income and their state’s
monthly limit over a stipulated period that ranges from one to six
months, depending on the state.14 Monthly income limits for an individual in 2018 ranged from $100 in Louisiana to $1,041 in Vermont.
The median value for an individual was $488. Limits for a couple
ranged from $192 in Louisiana to $1,372 in Illinois. The median for
a couple was $559.
The application of this rule is complex, and an example of how
it might be applied may be helpful. Consider an individual applicant
with a monthly income of $2,800 and who is a resident of West Virginia, where the monthly income limit is $200 and the budgetary
period is six months. The applicant would have to incur $15,600, or
($2,800 – $200) × 6 in medical expenditures to be eligible for Medicaid’s coverage on additional expenditures for the remainder of the
budgetary period. To take another example, suppose an individual has
a monthly income of $6,500 in a state with a monthly income limit
of $500. With a budgetary period of six months, the individual must
incur medical expenses of $36,000, or (6 × $6,000), before Medicaid
would cover excess expenditures for the remainder of the budgetary
period. Once that period ends, the whole procedure must begin again.
This second example makes clear that the relief the medically needy
pathway offers drops significantly with increases in income.
Any American who satisfies the asset test and whose income falls
below the limits set by the original Medicaid program or the special income test is effectively insured by Medicaid against the risk
of requiring long-term care. The fact that many older Americans can
expect to rely on financing from Medicaid should they need longterm care conceivably may reduce the incentive they have to save
for their declining years. Nonetheless, nursing home residents are
expected to contribute most of their income to defraying the costs
incurred on their behalf before Medicaid kicks in.15 They are allowed
only a small personal allowance. If only a little money is remaining after the nursing home takes its share, the sharing rule may be
inflicting hardship. How much discretionary income a nursing home
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resident would require over and above what is needed to cover food,
other basic living expenses, and the cost of care is an important issue.
In the case of a nursing home resident with a spouse, rules are in
place to avoid the spouse’s impoverishment because of large longterm-care expenditures on behalf of his or her chronically ill spouse.
The financial arrangements for Medicaid’s coverage of long-term
care differ substantially from those of Medicare’s coverage of shortterm illness or disability. All Americans aged 65 or older who qualify
for Social Security and pay their share of the payroll taxes that finance
it and Medicare are eligible for Medicare. Medicare Part A, which
covers hospitalization, is normally free of charge. Part B, which covers the fees of doctors and other health care providers, requires a
premium that varies with income. Part C, which is known as Medicare Advantage, provides coverage through HMOs and several other
vehicles, and can substitute for Medicare Parts A and B. Part D is
a prescription drug program provided by private plans. It includes
a catastrophic coverage limit. Mackenzie (2020) offers a summary
description of the whole program.
Unlike the risk of exposure to health care costs of Americans aged
65 or older, the degree of exposure to long-term care risk depends on
income and the state of residence. Older Americans whose incomes
are below the SSI limit and who satisfy the asset test are covered. In
addition, older Americans are covered if they are a resident in one of
the 42 states or D.C. that have adopted the special income pathway,
have an income less than three times the SSI limit, and satisfy the
asset test. In the remaining eight states, the medically needy pathway
also may provide relief to some, but the asset test may require a substantial spend-down.16
Of the 43 states (including D.C. among the 43) that do grant eligibility through the special income pathway, only 26 also offer eligibility through the medically needy pathway. Older Americans in
the other 17 states with relatively high incomes, and without private
long-term care insurance, must rely entirely on their own resources to
pay for long-term care (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Number of States with the Special Income Pathway and/or
the Medically Needy Pathwaya
States offering both pathways
26
States offering only the special income pathway
17
States offering the medically needy pathway
8
Total, including D.C.
51
All states and D.C. offer at least one of these two pathways.
SOURCE: Musumeci, Chidambaram, and O’Malley Watts (2019) and author’s calculations.

a

Relying on Medicaid rather than taking out private long-term
care insurance makes some sense for older Americans with modest
incomes. Note, however, that while relying on private long-term care
insurance requires the payment of premiums typically starting some
and often many years before need, private insurance normally pays all
or at least much of the expenses of long-term care once care begins,
and long-term care policyholders would have more choice regarding care either in a congregate setting or at home than they typically
would under Medicaid. Older people with private long-term care
insurance would be much more likely to afford residing at an ALF
than the typical person without that insurance.
If older Americans cannot qualify for long-term care benefits
under Medicaid and lack private long-term care insurance, what
expenses would they face? A 2017 study finds that the probability
that one or both members of a healthy 65-year-old couple will move
to a nursing home at some point in their remaining lifetime is 78 percent; the probability of visits by a home health aide is 63 percent; and
the probability of residing in an assisted living facility is 29 percent
(Crook and Sutedja 2017).17 Despite the likelihood that older Americans will need some kind of long-term care, the median duration of
a nursing home stay was estimated to be only 9 months. The median
duration of home health visits and residence in ALFs was 14 months.
A more recent study finds that the probability of a 65-year-old in 2020
developing a disability severe enough to require long-term care is 56
percent (Favreault and Dey 2021).
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With the median annual cost of a nursing home stay in 2020
at about $93,000, the cost of long stays becomes prohibitive.18 The
chances that a nursing home stay lasts for more than one year has
been estimated at 32 percent for at least one member of a healthy
65-year-old couple; the probability of a stay of more than three years
has been estimated at 8 percent (Crook and Sutedja 2017). The odds
that an older American who does not qualify for Medicaid will incur
substantial expenses for long-term care are not negligible, but neither are they large. Comparing the contingencies covered by auto
and long-term care insurance, it is highly unlikely that Americans
can pass through life without having to deal with an auto accident
of some degree of seriousness, and consequently most people have
at least an intuitive understanding of the benefits of auto insurance.19
The probability of requiring long-term care is lower than that of a
serious car crash or car theft, however. As a result, wishful thinking
may lead many people to underestimate their exposure to the latter
contingency, or to expect that family members will be able to care
for them, without considering the emotional and financial burden that
home care can involve.
The older Americans who are most exposed to the risk of longterm care expenses are those who live in the 17 states that do not offer
eligibility through the medically needy pathway, and whose incomes
exceed the limit of three times SSI. Residents in these states who are
65 years or older account for about 30 percent of the national total.
Assuming, perhaps conservatively, that no more than 50 percent of
the elder population fails this test (i.e., that one in two has income
more than three times the SSI limit), it would amount to about 14 percent of the population age 65 years and older. The asset test, however,
also must be met. If it cannot, then candidates for long-term care must
spend down those of their assets that are deemed to be countable for
the purposes of the asset test or protect them by establishing a trust.20

How Care Is Financed 39

ACTUARIAL AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF
CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT FACILITIES
Viewed from the economic point of view, the basic feature of a
CCRC is that it is a risk-sharing arrangement, one that entails obvious risks for both parties.21 Prospective residents in CCRCs, as well
as CCRCs themselves, confront longevity risk—the unpredictability
of lifespans. Both parties may also confront investment risk, the risk
of an uncertain rate of return on their reserves. The degree of both
longevity and investment risk depends on the nature of the contract
between the two parties.
Longevity risk is a basic risk for the CCRC (i.e., the owner or
owners) and for prospective residents, who have greater life expectancies than the general population. In part, this reflects the fact that
CCRC residents are wealthier than the general population, and there
is a positive relationship between wealth and longevity.22 A further
influence is adverse selection—persons interested in joining a CCRC
are likely to believe that they will live there for many years, particularly if the move requires that they sell a home in which they have
lived for many years, which is not an easy step for many older people
to make. It is also argued that the community aspect of living in a
CCRC promotes longevity.
In addition to longevity (or mortality) risk, there is also morbidity
risk—the risk that a resident may need to move to the assisted living
or nursing care component of the community, which increases the
costs for the CCRC. It is important to distinguish between the risk of
a temporary transfer to the nursing home component and a permanent
transfer, that is, one that lasts until the death of the resident.
As Chapter 1 explains, the typical CCRC contract involves a
large entry fee with continuing monthly payments until the death of
the resident, or both residents if a couple. A prospective resident may
have a choice between several combinations of entry fee and monthly
payment. With the largest entry fee, there is no increase in the monthly
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fee in the event of a transfer to the nursing component. Residents may
also be offered a trade-off, where in return for a smaller entry fee,
they accept the risk that their monthly fee may increase in the event
of a transfer. Not all CCRCs offer the intermediate step of assisted
living between independent living and the nursing home component,
and some limit the number of days that may be spent in nursing at an
unchanged monthly fee. A rental arrangement is also possible, where
there is no sizeable up-front entry fee.23
With the large entry fee, the CCRC is taking on the risk that its
earnings and the fee itself will not cover the expenses of a very longlived resident, or one who will require many years of nursing-level
care. Contracts typically provide for the partial or total reimbursement of the entry fee if the new resident dies within some stipulated
period after entering the community. However, once that period has
elapsed, no refund is possible. In addition, contracts will typically
provide for periodic adjustments in monthly fees to reflect increases
in the cost of providing a given level of service.
Without having precise numbers for entry fees and monthly payments, it is impossible to draw hard and fast conclusions about the
advantages and disadvantages of different contracts for prospective
residents and owners. If, however, we compare two basic versions of
a CCRC contract—one with a large entry fee and one with a smaller
entry fee, and correspondingly smaller and larger monthly fees—we
may draw some qualitative conclusions. The large entry fee contract
may seem more attractive to residents who worry about their ability
to afford an increase in monthly fees in the event of serious illness
or who have enough of a nest egg that paying the larger entry fee
will not unduly deplete their reserves. Residents choosing a smaller
entry fee also incur the risk that the return on their reserves may be
disappointing.
From the CCRC’s perspective, the contract with the larger entry
fee may look attractive if it thinks that residents overestimate their
own longevity. There is also the advantage of getting the money up
front and avoiding the complications that arise if a resident cannot pay
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the monthly fee.24 However, in agreeing to the contract with the large
entry fee, a CCRC is more exposed to the consequence of an extended
stay in the nursing home component of the facility.25 Another potential risk for the CCRC is a decline in new entrants, which some connected with the industry have noted can occur with declines in the
market for residential real estate, because the sale of a household’s
principal residence often provides the money for the entrance fee.
Regulatory Issues
As of 2018, only 38 states had any kind of regulatory framework for CCRCs (Breeding 2018), the same number as GAO (2010)
reported. The remaining states and D.C. had none. Broadly speaking
there are two distinct aspects to the regulation of CCRCs: the regulation of their role as providers of health care, which pertains mainly to
their assisted living and nursing home components, and their financial
regulation. All 38 states regulate the provision of health care in tandem with the federal government (as do all the states and D.C.). In
Maryland, for example, the CCRC regulatory function is the responsibility of the Department of Aging. The department’s website notes
that only part of the contractual arrangements of CCRCs are subject
to regulatory law. On its website, the department “urges anyone who
is considering moving into a CCRC to consult with an attorney and a
financial advisor familiar with these types of agreements before signing any documents.”26 This is certainly good advice, but one wonders
if it is enough.
It appears that the 38 states that regulate CCRCs do require that
they provide basic financial accounting statements, such as a statement
of assets and financial liabilities, as well as income and expenses. The
former would include a valuation of the CCRC’s real property with
an estimate of depreciation, as well as financial assets and any debt.
A basic income statement would include among its elements on the
income side monthly fees paid by residents, in addition to payments
for other amenities like cable, internet, and dining subscriptions.
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Breeding (2018) notes that the mandatory requirements and
degree of oversight among the 38 states can vary substantially. North
Carolina requires annual audited financial statements with disclosure
statements. Operating reserves must be maintained at 50 percent or
more of forecasted operating revenue for the next 12 months, although
this ratio may drop to 25 percent for CCRCs with occupancy rates
of 90 percent or higher. Breeding also notes that no CCRC in North
Carolina has gone bankrupt to date. Some states are said to have less
stringent reporting requirements, and apparently some have more.
The GAO (2010) report was based on a study of CCRCs in eight
of the country’s most populous states.27 It found that only three of
them required actuarial valuations.28 A financial statement of assets
and liabilities can make a CCRC appear to be in good financial condition when it is seriously undercapitalized. A periodic actuarial valuation of a CCRC’s contingent liabilities is needed for a comprehensive
evaluation of its true financial condition. Quite apart from these actuarial issues, there have also been some cases of misappropriation of
financial assets.

PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
The market for private long-term care insurance has seen better days.29 Its origins date from the early 1990s, and by 2000 about
100 insurance companies were in the market. However, their numbers began to shrink subsequently (Cohen 2019). According to Cohen
(2019), the number of active claims in 2019 was about 300,000, and
there were about seven million policies.
In its current form, a policy for private long-term care insurance
stipulates a maximum lifetime benefit payout and a typically maximum payout period as well as a maximum daily payout, which may
vary depending on whether the policyholder lives in a congregate
setting like a private nursing home or an ALF or lives at home and
receives trained care. Home caregivers are typically provided through
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an agency that the insurance company has vetted. The insurance company pays the agency on behalf of the policyholder and the agency
pays the caregiver and is responsible for withholding payroll and
income taxes. Caregivers who perform basic tasks typically receive
a modest wage.30 Some policies may also pay family caregivers a
modest stipend.
Long-term care insurance issuers are subject to regulation at the
state level. States require that once a policy has been issued it may
not be revoked unless the policyholder is unable to pay the premium,
which is normally due annually. The premium is supposed to be set
so that, taking account of the reserves that will accrue on premiums,
it will not need to be adjusted, apart from changes that the regulating state deems are necessary given changes in underwriting costs. In
their adjudication of requests for premium increases from insurance
companies, states are expected to strike a balance between the interests of the policy issuer and policyholders.
Premiums increase with the age at which the insurance is contracted. The younger the age, the longer will be the expected period
that elapses before a claim is activated, because the need for longterm care insurance increases with age, and because with an increase
in the interval between the start of coverage and the activation of a
claim the longer the period over which reserves can accumulate. The
level at which a premium is set is also a function of lapse rates, and
the younger the age at which coverage begins, the greater the chances
that it will be allowed to lapse.
To trigger a claim, a policyholder must demonstrate to the insurer
that he or she is unable to carry out a number of the six ADLs—
usually two—or display a significant degree of cognitive decline.31
This assessment is necessary to deal with the problems of moral hazard, which we touched on in Chapter 1 in the discussion of publicly
provided long-term care, and adverse selection. Moral hazard can crop
up with long-term care insurance when the policyholder exaggerates
or falsifies a claim of inability to perform ADLs. Adverse selection,
the tendency for an insurance arrangement to attract clients who are
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more likely than the average person to need the insurance, is also a
feature of this market and contributes to the gap observed between the
premium for a group policy and an individual policy, the former being
less susceptible to adverse selection than the latter.
There are several reasons for the decline in this market. Insurers
underestimated the longevity of claimants and overestimated lapse
rates, and did not foresee the rate at which the cost of care increased.
The general decline in interest rates that has taken place over the
past 20 years has required an increased buildup in reserves to offset a given liability. These developments have increased break-even
premia and reduced demand. An NAIC study (Nordman 2016) found
that the average income of new policyholders had increased substantially since the early 2000s. The American Association for LongTerm Care Insurance (2021) reports that in 2021, a select policy with
a lifetime maximum of $165,000 would cost a 60-year-old woman
$1,900 and a 60-year-old man $1,175. If the maximum benefit of the
policy increases by 3 percent per year, premiums would be $4,300
and $3,525, respectively. These figures are high enough to deter many
middle-income households from acquiring a policy given the uncertainty surrounding the eventual need for long-term care and the age at
which care would be needed.
Price is not the only influence on demand for private long-term
care insurance, however. Both Medicaid and private long-term care
insurance provide protection against catastrophic loss entailed by
a long period of care, although Medicaid is subject to the stringent
means-testing previously described, and private long-term care insurance is not. Self-insurance against such a contingency is possible only
for the rich. Consequently, private long-term care insurance and the
publicly provided benefit may compete with one another.32 But private
insurance has clear advantages over Medicaid, most notably, the protection of assets and income from means-testing, the choice of facility
if institutionalized care is required, and perhaps also the quality of
care at home. However, ignorance about the costs of Medicaid also
plays a role. Many Americans believe that Medicare, not Medicaid,
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covers long-term care, and many are unaware of the stringent eligibility requirements that Medicaid imposes, especially on those who have
not protected their assets by establishing a trust.33 Greater awareness
of the advantage of private insurance as well as a greater awareness
of the real risk of one day needing long-term care would undoubtedly
increase demand for it. However, it is easy for people in their fifties
and sixties to downplay that risk because of its uncertain timing and
the fact that the risk increases with age. A further inhibiting influence
on demand may be the unpredictability of premium increases.
Private long-term care insurance could cover more U.S. households than it does. One promising development has been the emergence of so-called combination products, such as the life care annuity, whose payout increases if the policyholder demonstrates a need
for long-term care. The product reduces underwriting costs because
its potential clientele have shorter life expectancies than traditional
annuitants. The market might also grow if private insurance could
take the form of a “front-end” product that covered the first two years
or so of need before Medicaid kicked in. This would reduce its cost.
However, the cost of traditional private insurance policies and the
existence of a public option are obstacles to the development of a
larger market for them.

UNPAID CAREGIVERS
As emphasized in Chapter 1, the number of older Americans in
need of assistance with one or more of the ADLs, living at home, and
being helped by a relative or in some cases someone from outside the
family dwarfs the number living in congregate settings. These caregivers should not be confused with either the health care workers who
come to the homes of elderly persons in need of assistance with ADLs
or instrumental ADLs or those who provide the more specialized services provided under Medicaid’s HCBS programs.
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As noted, above, Medicaid does pay some of the relatives and
others who provide basic care, but the terms vary considerably from
state to state, and it is extremely difficult to know how many of the
huge number of the nation’s caregivers receive any money at all. In
fact, the AARP studies of home care already cited (AARP 2020a,b)
effectively assumes that all home caregivers are unpaid.
That there are so many unpaid caregivers raises difficult economic, financial, political, administrative, and moral or social issues.
These issues intertwine and overlap, and it is not easy to pull them
apart to analyze. However, it is worth trying to do so. Our discussion
begins with the moral aspects of the issue. Unpaid caregivers shoulder an obvious economic and psychological burden. Studies by AARP
have repeatedly found that the great majority of caregivers also work
for pay outside the home and come from all age classes. The time
they spend as caregivers reduces the hours that those of them who are
potential labor force participants can work for pay outside the home,
and the hours they can devote to other productive activities within
the home, such as meal preparation and supervising homework—or
simply relaxing, which of course is also true of caregivers who have
retired themselves.
This economic cost caregivers and their families bear raises the
question of whether society at large—that is, the taxpayer—should
compensate them for looking after their older and infirm relations.34
Doing so would of course require an increase in taxes and/or a reduction in other public expenditure programs, and many observers might
argue that the benefit of the activity of caregivers does not accrue to
society at large but to the families of the people being cared for. But
the same argument might be advanced to oppose taxes that finance
education or child care for low-income families, if one argues that
these taxes benefit only families with school-aged children, not older
families.35 In addition, caring for persons aged 65 or older must
reduce the demand for beds at nursing homes, which does reduce the
general tax burden. Caregiving also reduces the time that givers can
devote to their own children, and to furthering their own education.

How Care Is Financed 47

This may impose a cost on society. More generally, if we accept that
society at large has a moral obligation to provide some support for the
disabled elderly, then we also effectively assume a responsibility of
not allowing an undue share of that burden to fall on their caregivers.
This is a moral or an ethical judgment and not a statement that can be
refuted by evidence. By this point the reader will have realized that it
is a judgment the author shares.
Caregiving has an obvious economic cost, what economists call
its opportunity cost—caregivers could be doing something else productive with their time. AARP has published a regular series of studies that address the issue of what it has aptly termed “valuing the
invaluable.” These studies make calculations of the economic cost
of the time spent by caregivers, which can serve as a basis for calculating what a public policy of remunerating them would cost the
public purse. The latest of the AARP studies is based on four different sources, with various estimates of the number of caregivers, the
average number of hours they work, and the average wage that should
apply to their work (Reinhard et al. 2019). The AARP’s weighted
analysis of these studies yields a total wage bill or cost of $370 billion, which is about 2 percent of 2017 nominal GDP, the year for
which the data was collected.36
In macroeconomic terms this is not a tiny sum. It would require
a substantial increase in the national tax burden to finance it—at the
federal level, if the benefit were paid by the federal government,
which would mark a shift away from the traditional sharing of costs
by Medicaid programs, the tax burden would have to increase by over
10 percent of all federal tax revenues, including the payroll taxes that
finance Social Security.
Any increase in taxation is politically contentious. The nature
of the expenditure this tax increase would be financing also raises
administrative issues. In particular, the issue of monitoring the work of
caregivers arises. Should caregivers be required to submit a verifiable
accounting of the number of hours they put in each week? Although
requiring a submission at periodic but not too frequent intervals might
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not impose a huge paperwork burden on the caregiver, verifying its
accuracy would undoubtedly impose an unrealistic burden on the
monitoring agency of the government concerned. One approach that
would avoid excessive compliance burdens on caregivers or monitoring costs for government might be to require simply demonstrating
that an older family member was in obvious need, perhaps once per
year, and was being cared for. No accounting of the number of hours
of care provided would be required. Instead, some stipulated number
of hours of care might be assumed. This approach would amount to a
sort of presumptive assessment of the burden of care, at least in terms
of hours, and could make sense from an administrative point of view.
This chapter has covered a broad range of complicated issues. Its
basic theme is that the current system of long-term care is both excessively complicated and underfinanced. Its complexity means that its
basic features are not well understood either by many persons who
will soon need long-term care or by the taxpayer. The lack of financing for care at home is inefficient to the extent that it results in institutionalization that is more costly than care provided at home (Kaye,
LaPlante, and Harrington 2009). The lack of financing may be judged
as inequitable to the extent that society adopts an ethical standard that
older infirm persons deserve an adequate standard of care, whether at
home or in an institution.
Notes
1. This section draws largely on Rudowitz et al. (2021).
2. To be eligible for Medicare, a person must have reached the age of 65
and have worked and contributed to Social Security for 40 quarters,
regardless of his or her state of residence. To draw a retirement pension, a person must have reached the age of 62. The retirement pension increases with the number of years worked and average wages as
calculated by Social Security (actually the 35 years with the highest
wages, which are indexed to the economy-wide wage rate for the calculation). The benefit, once elected, is indexed to consumer prices and
also increases with the age at which it is elected up to age 70. Some of
Social Security’s rules are quite complex but they do not vary from state
to state.
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3. Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories are all subject to a limit on the federal government’s share of 50 percent—so there is no adjustment for per
capita income—as well as a dollar limit. If the dollar limit is exceeded,
the federal government’s share automatically drops below 50 percent.
4. A block grant arrangement has its own drawbacks. The amount of the
grant would have to be adjusted regularly just to keep up with inflation.
In addition, even an inflation-adjusted grant would have to be adjusted
to keep up with population growth, which would vary from state to
state. Veghte and Bradley (2017) discuss the drawbacks of block grants
and per capita block grants.
5. Disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) serve many Medicaid and lowincome uninsured patients. States have considerable discretion in determining the payments to each DSH hospital, and federal DSH funds are
capped at both the state and the facility level. Payments to DSH hospitals were about 3 percent of Medicaid’s total budget in FY 2019.
6. This discussion draws on Mackenzie (2020), which in turn draws on
Musumeci, Chidambaram, and O’Malley Watts (2019). It also draws on
Skračić, Bond, and Doonan (2020).
7. A certain amount of income is disregarded in applying the income test,
which varies from state to state but is usually small.
8. The limits of the income and asset tests and other limits included in
this and the next two paragraphs are for the year 2018 and come from
Musumeci, Chidambaram, and O’Malley Watts (2019). Higher disregards apply to boarding homes and shared living (i.e., noninstitutional)
arrangements.
9. Eight states have elected an option allowing them to use their own
income criteria provided these are no more restrictive than what they
had in place in 1972.
10. Arizona has no limit on asset holdings for either individuals or couples.
11. The limit is 250 percent of SSI in Delaware. In Missouri, it varies by
program. The eight states that have not opted for the special income rule
are California, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North
Carolina, and North Dakota. These states have all opted to participate
in the medically needy pathway described next. Massachusetts does
not apply the special income rule regarding institutions (e.g., nursing
homes) but does apply it for HCBS.
12. In about half of the states, individuals whose income exceeds 300 percent of the SSI can still be eligible for support from Medicaid if they
establish what is known as a Miller trust, and they administer through
it the income that exceeds 300 percent of the SSI. See Musumeci,
Chidambaram, and O’Malley Watts (2019) for additional discussion.
13. All 34 states apply this pathway for pregnant women and children; 32
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14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

states apply it for seniors and the disabled (Texas and Tennessee being
the exceptions); and 26 states apply it for low-income parents.
Eleven states have opted for a budgetary period of one month, and 13
states have opted for six months. In several other states, the limit depends
on whether the applicant plans to remain in the community (Musumeci,
Chidambaram, and O’Malley Watts 2019, Appendix Table 3).
Recipients of community-based services can retain much more of their
income because they will be responsible for much more of the basic
costs of living, such as lodging, food and clothing.
In Massachusetts, as noted, the special income rule covers HCBS but
not institutional care.
The probabilities add up to more than 100 percent because a couple can
experience not just one but two or all three of these outcomes.
Genworth (2020) estimates that the median national cost of a semiprivate room in a nursing home in 2020 was about $93,000.
Belbase, Cen, and Munnell (2021) find that about one in five 65-yearold Americans will not require long-term care at any level of intensity,
while about one-quarter will require at least a moderate to high level of
care for some years.
For a general discussion of estate planning and the role it can play in
preserving a family’s assets when long-term care becomes necessary,
see Correia, Sayre, and Allen (2017).
The classic study of CCRC finances and actuarial issues is Winklevoss
and Powell (1984). The most comprehensive recent study of CCRC
regulatory issues is GAO (2010).
Wilkinson and Pickett (2011) present evidence that, even within the
Washington, D.C., area, life expectancy rises enormously as one travels
from one end of the Red Line of the Metro system to the other.
Some observers argue that smaller entry fees are almost always more
desirable because most CCRCs do not include in their pricing the benefit of the interest earnings on the entry fee (or the debt service foregone
that would otherwise be required without the entry fee). Moreover, entry
fees are at-risk investments if the debt a CCRC has incurred is senior
to entry fees, which means that the creditors’ claims take precedence
over the claims of residents. Because the smallest entry fee is no entry
fee, some observers argue that pure rental communities are growing in
popularity as trust in the entry fee model for financing aging is eroding.
In one CCRC with which the author is familiar, there are charitable
drives to raise funds for residents who are no longer able to afford their
monthly fees. Both better-off residents and outsiders can contribute to
these charities. In another there is a tacit understanding that no resident
who becomes unable to pay the monthly charge will be asked to leave.
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25. To reduce the risk it accepts in taking on a new entrant, a CCRC will
require a physical examination as well as evidence of a new entrant’s
ability to pay the CCRC’s monthly fees.
26. https://aging.maryland.gov/Pages/continuing-care-retirement-commu
nities.aspx (accessed July 24, 2022).
27. The eight states are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.
28. California, New York, and Texas require periodic actuarial studies, but
only for those CCRCs that offer contracts that incur long-term liabilities
by guaranteeing health care services over the long term.
29. This section of the chapter draws on a comprehensive study by Nordman (2016) under the auspices of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the Center for Insurance Policy and
Research as well as the other sources cited.
30. One established agency in the Washington, D.C., area pays caregivers
who assist its clients with difficulty performing ADLs or with significant
cognitive decline an hourly wage of $12.00–$13.00.
31. A standard test of cognitive ability is demonstrating the ability to count
backwards from 100 by seven.
32. Brown and Finkelstein (2009) argue that Medicaid has substantially
reduced the demand for private insurance.
33. The survey previously noted found that more than 4 in 10 of the general
population surveyed, who were aged 50+ years either thought that a
public program would pay for most of the cost of six months of longterm care or expressed ignorance (Life Plans 2017). However, the survey also reports a growing awareness that public programs will not step
up to the plate.
34. Perhaps it is needless to point out that the same issue arises with caring
for young seriously disabled family members, although they number far
less than older persons in need of care.
35. Education economists generally agree, however, that schooling at the
primary and perhaps the secondary levels has social benefits that go
beyond the benefits enjoyed by the students and their families. The benefits at the tertiary level are considered to accrue mainly to the students
and their families.
36. The study is based on an estimated nationwide hourly wage of $13.81.
The hourly wage estimates by state ranged from $10.57 in Louisiana to
$18.01 in Alaska. The figure for the number of caregivers is 41 million,
which is based on a weighted average of the survey estimates adjusted
to match their demographic composition to eliminate over or undersampling. The calculations assume a 16-hour average work week and
a work year of 52 weeks. For further discussion, see Reinhard et al.
(2019).

Chapter 3

A Comparative Analysis

Just as health care systems differ enormously across countries, even

across the great majority of high-income countries with universal
health care, the way in which countries provide long-term care services and supports differs greatly as well. To use Veghte’s (2021) terminology, the model that countries follow can be classified as social
insurance, universal comprehensive coverage, residual coverage, or
a hybrid.
Social insurance is usually financed by payroll taxation, like
Social Security in the United States, and its benefits may be limited to
contributing workers and their families. In practice, however, coverage is near universal. Universal comprehensive coverage applies to
the whole population of a country and is normally financed by the
central government’s budget. Residual systems are means-tested,
and as the term suggests, hybrid systems combine elements of one
or more of the first three. Germany and Holland are prime examples
of the social insurance model, while the Nordic countries are exemplars of universal comprehensive coverage. The United States and the
United Kingdom are both means-tested systems. Veghte (2021) classifies France’s system as a hybrid because it is financed by both general revenues and payroll taxes, and because, although its coverage is
universal and is not means-tested as such, benefits decline as income
increases. Even social insurance systems may have some benefits or
services that are means-tested, and coverage may be limited in other
ways. For example, room and board in long-term care institutions
may not be covered.
A social insurance system can be pay-as-you-go or funded, or
somewhere in between. The typical system is pay-as-you-go. With a
fully funded system, the contributions of a given age cohort of workers are expected to finance their long-term care needs. When the system is first introduced, it builds up a surplus, at least on paper, because
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at its inception contributions far outstrip expenditure.1 Medicaid is
not a funded system. The supplementary system established in Washington State in 2019 and described in Chapter 1 is a funded system.
The role of private long-term care insurance varies across countries, but typically it is a niche market if it exists at all. As Chapter 2
explains, the role of the private long-term care insurance market in
the United States is quite limited: as of 2019, outstanding policies
amounted to about 7 million, or about 5 percent of the country’s labor
force, and about 7 percent of the aged 55+ population. Its role in other
high-income countries varies. In Germany, some 12 percent of the
population has private long-term care insurance, mainly because the
federal government puts caps on the amount of support it pays to persons in need of long-term care. However, the government subsidizes
the purchase of long-term care insurance to some extent.2
Typically, publicly provided long-term care begins with institutional care before extending its reach to home care. This was the
case with the Nordic countries, which were the pioneers in universal
long-term care. There has been a general tendency across countries—
including in the United States, as Chapter 2 notes—to increase the
role of care provided in the home while reducing reliance on institutionalized care. With well-designed policies, this development should
increase the welfare of care recipients and reduce the burden of longterm care on public finances.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE MEANS-TESTED
APPROACH
A comprehensive study from the OECD (Hashiguchi and Nozal
2020) on the cost to households of long-term care and notably of its
impact on the risk of declining into what the study calls relative poverty contrasts the workings of long-term care provision in regions
or entire OECD member countries, including two U.S. states, Cali-
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fornia and Illinois, as well as England (Scotland, Northern Ireland,
and Wales are excluded), France, Germany, and Japan. The study
estimates the share of the elderly population that would experience
relative poverty, defined as a level of income below the populationwide median, with and without the country or region’s long-term care
regime, for differing levels of long-term care needs. The United States
does not fare well in this international comparison. In both California
and Illinois, Medicaid does not reduce the share of the elderly experiencing relative poverty.3
In England, social care is both income- and assets-tested. Minimum allowances guarantee that a share of care recipients’ incomes is
protected, and care recipients with assets less than £14,250, or about
$19,000, as of December 31, 2021, are eligible for public support
covering 100 percent of the costs of care. Conversely, older people
with assets worth over £23,250 receive no public support. Apart from
the minimum income allowance, they must cover the full costs of care
(Hashiguchi and Nozal 2020). However, and unlike the U.S. case,
the provision of public assistance keeps most older people in need of
long-term care from falling into relative poverty.
The OECD study also compares the share of elderly people
already living in relative poverty by the study’s definition who do not
need benefits under their country’s system with the share that would
decline into relative poverty if they needed long-term care at home,
even with public benefits. Again, the United States fares poorly by
comparison with most other countries, including England.
One basic, if obvious, lesson that may be drawn from these analyses is that the impact of means-testing on disposable income after
taking account of the out-of-pocket costs that long-term care support does not cover is that it depends on how stringently the income
and asset limits are set, and on their design. The OECD study does,
however, argue that countries with comprehensive income and asset
means-testing generally do less well at protecting the elderly population at risk for needing long-term care from poverty.
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Another notable international comparative statistic is the share
of GDP that the major industrial countries (the G-7) spend on longterm care (see Table 3.1). The share of expenditures by Medicaid on
both residential and HCBS care was 0.9 percent in the United States
in FY 2019, which is lower than the other six countries except Italy
(for which the reported year was 2017). This is partly related to the
comparatively young demography of the United States as well as the
limits imposed by Medicaid on the share of the elderly population that
qualifies for public support.
Table 3.1 Long-Term Care Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP,
G-7 Countries
Health component Social component
Total
Canada
1.3
–
1.3
France
1.3
0.6
1.9
Germany
1.5
0.0
1.5
Italy
0.7
–
0.7
Japan
1.8
–
1.8
United Kingdoma
1.2
0.3
1.4
United States
–
–
0.9
Numbers do not sum due to rounding.
SOURCE: OECD (2019) for all countries except the United States. Author’s estimate
for the United States based on Rudowitz et al. (2021). The U.S. figure is for fiscal
year (FY) 2019. The values for the other countries are for 2017. “Health component”
refers to institutional care and care related to the activities of daily living (ADLs),
whereas “Social component” refers to care related to the instrumental ADLs.

a

All the major industrial countries are parsimonious compared to
the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, all of which have universal coverage. Norway, Denmark, and Holland all spent more than 3
percent of GDP on long-term care in 2017, and Sweden and Finland
spent more than 2 percent.
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HOW CANADA AND GERMANY ADDRESS THE
CHALLENGE OF LONG-TERM CARE
The long-term care systems in Canada and Germany, which are
profiled below, are undoubtedly different in important respects from
the U.S. system. Of the two, Canada’s is the more similar. They are
both more expensive than the U.S. system, and reforms to the U.S.
system that make it more like either of them would require a significant increase in public financing. That said, neither the Canadian
nor the German system is nearly as expensive as the systems in Holland and Scandinavia. Given the probably insurmountable political
difficulties that would be encountered in adopting a version of these
latter systems, it makes sense to consider the less expensive systems.
Moreover, the systems in both countries, especially Germany, have
significant advantages over the U.S. system in the way they provide
or finance long-term care to their older citizens.
Canada
The Canadian long-term care system does not fit neatly into one
of the three classes of universal coverage, social insurance, or meanstested. Coverage is not universal or near-universal, but care is not
means-tested either. These features mean that in some respects the
Canadian system is closer to the U.S. system than it is to the systems
in most European countries, except the United Kingdom. As was the
case in the United States until the passage of the Social Security Act
in 1935, long-term care in Canada bore the vestiges of the Elizabethan Poor Laws following the end of World War II, which also saw
the establishment of a chain of hospitals for war veterans. In Ontario,
Canada’s largest province, the Homes for the Aged Act passed in
1949 ushered in the entry of the government into the provision of
long-term care.4
The public sector’s role in the provision of long-term care in
Canada and in its financing are in some ways similar to those in the
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United States, but in others quite different. In Canada, the provision
of both health care and long-term care is primarily in the provincial
domain. The provinces and the federal government share in financing
institutional care, but there is no long-established quantitative rule to
determine the relative share that the federal government pays in any
province, as is the case with Medicaid, and the provinces, unlike their
U.S. state counterparts, pay for the lion’s share of care.
The beginning of a major role for the provinces in long-term
care was in the mid-1960s, about the same time that the provincial
governments under the aegis of the federal government implemented
Canada’s version of Medicare, which unlike the U.S. system, covers
all Canadians, regardless of age. Like the United States, Canada has
both public and privately run nursing homes (called long-term care
facilities or care homes), but eligibility for residence is not subject to
means-testing of either assets or income.5 The provinces set rates at
both classes of institution. However, the care provided by long-term
care homes is by no means free. Rather, residents or their families pay
a monthly rate that depends on the degree of privacy of the accommodation provided. In Ontario in 2019, these rates were about $1,487 for
what is described as basic accommodation; $1,784 for semiprivate;
and $2,112 for private (Picard 2021).6 Similar rates are said to be
charged in other provinces. These costs could pose a heavy financial burden on some middle-income Canadian families, although they
are heavily subsidized by the provinces. The total cost of operating
Canada’s nursing homes is more than double what residents and their
families pay.
In 2019, nursing homes had some 190,000 residents. Scaling that
figure up by a factor of nine—Canada’s population is about one-ninth
that of the United States—gives a figure of 1.7 million, compared to
the U.S. figure of around 1.3 million. About 6 in 10 residents in longterm care homes suffer from some form of dementia, a share similar
to that in U.S. nursing homes, and like U.S. nursing homes, a staff
of both skilled and unskilled caregivers is needed at all hours. An
additional 170,000 Canadians aged 65+ live in other congregate set-
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tings, for a total of about 360,000 residents in all congregate settings,
which is about 7 percent of Canada’s aged 65+ population, compared
to about 4 percent in the United States. The cost of these congregate
facilities—retirement communities, ALFs, or the Canadian equivalent of CCRCs—is not subsidized.7
In addition to the lack of means-testing, another distinguishing
feature of the Canadian system is the less important role now played
by home-based care in Canada compared with the United States.
Despite the costs that residents or their families incur for care in longterm care homes, there is a chronic shortage of beds and hence a waitlist for prospective residents. As of June 2017, Ontario—with a population of about 15 million, or less than 5 percent of the population of
the United States—was reporting a wait-list of 32,000 beds. The list
continues to grow at an annual rate of 15 percent (Canadian Association for Long Term Care 2020). Scaling Ontario’s wait-list figure up
to the U.S. population would result in a wait-list equal to about onehalf of the number of beds in the United States.8 The greater role of
home-based care in the United States must reflect the fact that Medicaid’s stringent means-testing effectively shuts out middle-income
families with elderly members who otherwise would be prepared to
live in nursing homes. This does not occur in Canada, at least not
to the same extent, and raises the basic issue of whether many of
the elderly Americans who are taken care of at home might be better
cared for in a nursing home, at least in one that maintained a highquality standard of care.
Some money is available for home care in Canada, but as Picard
(2021, pp. 66–67) notes, coverage varies widely across provinces,
with some provinces imposing monthly limits on the number of hours
of care per care recipient and others a dollar limit. A family wishing
to keep an elderly relative who needs substantial skilled care at home
must pay for virtually all the care provided itself. These limitations
on the available funding for home care must increase the demand
for institutionalized care. Nonetheless, the share of Canada’s elderly
population who are cared for at home is substantially less than that in
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the United States. Some 900,000 are estimated to have received home
care, compared with over 20 million in the United States (AARP
2020a). Again, if we scale up the Canadian figure by a factor of nine,
the number of elderly persons cared for at home is less than one-half
the U.S. number.
Germany
The provision of some form of long-term care in Germany, like
the old-age pension, can be traced back to Bismarck’s efforts to placate working-class unrest in the wake of the German Empire’s rapid
industrialization in the mid to late nineteenth century.9 Emanuel
(2020) remarks on the relative continuity of German social policy
over the subsequent cataclysmic upheavals of the First and Second
World Wars and the separation and reunification of East and West
Germany. East Germany’s system was replaced upon reunification
with the system of West Germany.
Contemporary Germany has a social insurance system but one
with nearly universal coverage. The German states are not involved in
financing the long-term care system. It is financed by a payroll tax that
is currently set at 1.525 percent of wages up to a cap of €4.838 (about
$5,500) in 2021 matched by an equal contribution from the federal
government, and it covers both workers and their dependents.10 A
period of two years of contributions is required before a benefit can
be earned, but the system is effectively pay-as-you-go: the payroll
tax rate has been increased several times in recent years to maintain a
rough balance between current revenues and expenditures. Childless
workers pay an extra 0.25 percent of their wages on the assumption
that more of the care the average childless worker might need will be
borne by the government, and less by his or her family. Able-bodied
retirees may also contribute to the system, and the self-employed pay
both the worker’s and the government’s share of the payroll tax, as is
the case with Social Security in the United States.
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Perhaps the key feature of the German system is that the federal
government places fixed limits on the payments it will make to finance
long-term care, with specific limits that increase with the degree or
amount of care required. There currently are five different levels at
which care is deemed to be provided, with a fixed Euro limit paid
for each. As a result, any residual or remainder expense is borne by
the recipients or their families. For some families, particularly those
with a member needing institutional care, this arrangement can entail
a significant burden, which is partially alleviated by social assistance
from the local community. In 2019, about one-third of residents in
long-term care facilities were receiving social assistance. The federal
government recently set a limit on the expenditure that families have
to bear for the care of their dependent older members. Local communities can require that the children of care recipients reimburse them
at least partially for the assistance that local communities pay if the
income of children exceeds a certain level, which has increased over
the years and is now relatively high. This feature reduces the cost
of the social assistance to the local community but must introduce a
degree of complexity into the long-term care financing system.
The current system has an obvious benefit for the federal government in that it is not financially open ended. However, this same
feature means that unless the payments the federal government makes
are adjusted (increased) at reasonably frequent intervals, the burden
borne by families will simply increase every year. Under the current
policy, the federal government does in fact increase the benefits it
pays at each of the five levels of care every three years. The system
really requires that a delicate balance be struck between the welfare
of families with members needing long-term care and the financial
position of the federal government. In the German system, virtually all families with an elderly member being cared for at home are
receiving either cash or in-kind benefits (like visits from nurses or
other health care providers). Cash benefits may be used to compensate family members for the time they spend as caregivers or to pay

62 Mackenzie

non-family members. This is not the general rule in either Canada or
the United States.
One feature of the German system that is not in either the Canadian or the U.S. system is the reliance on immigrants to provide care,
typically unskilled care.11 This reliance has undoubtedly held down
costs, but it has also raised concerns about the quality of care. That
said, the long-term care industry is not the only sector of the German
economy relying on labor from other European Union countries. For
those families not depending entirely on outside help, whether from
immigrant labor or not, the law requires employers to give caregivers in their employ up to 10 days of mostly paid leave for caregiving.
A proposal to substantially increase the generosity of this benefit is
under consideration.

LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The long-term care system in the United States has one clear
advantage over that of most other countries, including Germany and
Canada: it is less expensive. A possible additional advantage is that
the federal government may have more control, albeit indirect, over
its costs than other countries do over their costs. Although Medicaid
is an entitlement system, one in which states are obliged to provide
the statutory level of care for a resident who meets Medicaid’s eligibility requirements, the states have some incentive to control costs
and can do so by stinting on the quality of care and by limiting the
optional services they provide. Apart from its lower costs, however,
the U.S. long-term care system does not compare well with that of
either Canada or Germany.
Long-term care coverage in both countries, especially Germany,
is substantially broader than it is in the United States. In Germany,
families providing care do not necessarily have all their costs covered, but home care is much better supported, and family members
can be remunerated for their time and effort. In contrast, care by fam-
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ily members in the United States is mostly unremunerated. German
families are not subject to the stringent means-testing that Medicaid
applies, so, while not free, home-based care in Germany is available
to middle- and upper-income families.
As already noted, Canada’s system has the advantage over the
American system in that middle-income families can afford to pay for
institutionalized care. That care is both price and quantity rationed, as
the long waiting lists imply. The money available for care at home,
although it is not means-tested like in the United States, is not plentiful, however. As Chapter 2 discusses, the public financing of home
care can raise some thorny administrative issues. Germany appears
to have managed this aspect of long-term care better than North
America.
Notes
1. The qualification “on paper” is necessary because there is little or no
point in establishing a system that builds up a surplus if that surplus
simply finances other government expenditures.
2. See Chapter 6 in Emanuel (2020).
3. Neither California nor Illinois apply the special income rule, the second pathway for eligibility for Medicaid. Consequently, no one with an
income of more than 138 percent of the federal poverty line qualifies.
4. Previously, some institutional long-term care had been financed by
municipalities and charities. The province had also provided some
financing, but the 1949 act substantially increased its financial and
administrative role (Association of Municipalities of Ontario 2011).
5. Low-income earners can apply for subsidies, but these are available only
for basic accommodation, with perhaps three or four beds to a room.
6. These rates are the U.S. dollar equivalent of the Canadian dollar rates
reported in Picard (2021, p. 52), converted at the exchange rate of one
U.S. dollar equals 1.33 Canadian dollars, prevailing on December 31,
2021.
7. The figures for the number of residents in congregate settings comes
from Picard (2021).
8. In this respect, long-term care is like health care in Canada: it is partly
rationed by quantity, and not by price. For example, most Americans
with insurance in need of hip replacement do not typically have to wait
many weeks to schedule an operation. In Canada, unless the case is
deemed to be urgent, the wait can be much longer.
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9. This section draws heavily on Veghte (2021). Bismarck’s social programs were not particularly expensive at their inception. Relatively few
Germans survived to the age of 65, when they became entitled to a pension and when disability would have begun to set in with a vengeance.
10. Euros have been converted to dollars at the exchange rate of one Euro
equals $1.1371, prevailing on December 31, 2021.
11. A qualification of this remark as it applies to the United States may be
needed, in that undocumented immigrants are known to play a significant role in the unskilled workforce in nursing homes.

Chapter 4

The Impact of the
COVID-19 Pandemic on Older
Americans in Nursing Homes
and Other Institutions

The devastating effect that COVID-19 had on the residents in

America’s nursing homes became apparent even in the early stage of
the pandemic. In spring of 2020, news reports began drawing attention to the unusually high death rates occurring in nursing homes. As
of April 25, 2021, a couple months after the start of large-scale distribution of vaccines in the United States, an estimated 132,000 nursing
home residents had died of COVID-19, or roughly 1 in 10 of the total
number of residents (CMS 2021). The exact number may never be
known, in part because the reliability of the data differs from state to
state. In some states, deaths of caregivers have been confounded with
deaths of residents. In addition, the classification of cause of death by
coroners’ offices was not uniform across the country.
The pandemic has also caused deaths of residents in ALFs. The
fatality rate in ALFs appears to be much less than the rate among
nursing homes, but the data are less reliable, mainly because of differences among states in reporting requirements. It is uncertain what
impact the pandemic has had on residents in CCRCs.

NURSING HOMES
The shocking death toll in U.S. nursing homes is the result of at
least five different influences:1
1) COVID-19 has disproportionately killed older people, especially the very old (75+). This tendency is evident in the
65
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death rates by age of the population at large. As of May 6,
2021, the total number of deaths attributed to the pandemic
was about 576,000 (CDC 2021). Of that number, about 80
percent are estimated to have been aged 65 or older, and
most of these deaths were in people aged 75 or older.2 The
disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on the elderly is a
global phenomenon. The elderly account for the lion’s share
of deaths in Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
other countries as well. That said, the death rate among
Americans aged 65+ who are not living in nursing homes is
estimated to be 0.6 percent, which makes it a fraction of the
death rate in nursing homes.3
2) Unlike ALFs, nursing home residents typically have little
privacy. Most share a room with another resident or are
housed in dormitory-style quarters. Consequently, infections of all kinds have more opportunity to spread.
3) Caregivers would bring in the diseases from the broader
community. As of April 25, 2021, infections among caregivers were estimated to be about 575,000, compared with
an estimated total number of caregivers of about 945,000
in 2016 (NCHS 2019). Deaths among caregivers were estimated at about 1,900 (CMS 2021), which—assuming no
growth in the number of caregivers in 2016–2019—implies
a death rate of about 2 per 1,000. Making the not unreasonable assumption that virtually all caregivers were aged
less than 65 years, their rate of death is about five times
that of the population at large in this age range, and their
rate of infection was about five times that of the overall
population.4
4) Morbidity (the prevalence of disease and ill health in general) is higher in nursing homes than it is among the general
population of the same age.
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5) Sanitation standards in many nursing homes, as Chapter 1
discusses, have often been substandard, and the penalties
imposed on nursing homes reporting deficiencies in sanitary practices have not been onerous.
The pandemic will almost certainly have a profound impact on
the structure of the nursing home industry. The adjustment process
has not yet played out, and we cannot draw a firm conclusion on
the demand for beds. However, the number of residents is estimated
to have dropped by 16 percent between January 2020 and January
2021, or by about 200,000. Demand for beds may never fully recover
without the adoption of new policies assuring that adequate sanitation standards will be maintained. In the meantime, potential residents will be seriously considering the options of aging at home and,
their financial situation permitting, choosing to move to an ALF. That
said, the COVID-19-related deaths in these institutions will have had
a depressing effect on demand for apartments at ALFs as well.
On the supply side of the nursing home market, institutions will
probably choose to reconfigure their premises to offer their residents
more privacy, and in any case may be obliged to do so by changes to
the regulations that Medicaid eligibility payment requirements will
impose on them. These structural changes will reduce the number of
beds a home can offer and will increase their break-even cost per resident. The combined influences of contracting supply and demand (in
economists’ language, leftward-shifting supply and demand curves)
will reduce the number of beds the industry can offer. The impact on
the cost to residents is uncertain.
The dissemination of vaccines that began in January 2021
strongly favored the residents in nursing homes, as it should have.
By early May 2021, about 1.4 million residents in nursing homes,
ALFs, and similar institutions had been fully vaccinated. Death rates
in these institutions have dropped by almost 90 percent in 39 reporting states (which include the country’s most populous) in the first
four months of 2021 (Chidambaram and Garfield 2021). Nonetheless,
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COVID-19-related deaths in nursing homes as of early May 2021
were accounting for about 5 percent of nationwide deaths, despite the
small share of Americans who reside in these facilities.
The largely successful campaign to vaccinate nursing home residents appears to have effectively ended the devastation the pandemic
has wrought among the country’s nursing homes, although vaccine
hesitancy remains a problem among caregivers, as reflected in the fact
that less than half are fully vaccinated. But the COVID-19 pandemic
is certainly not going to be the last pandemic that America and the
world will face. What happened in the country’s nursing homes must
never be allowed to happen again. Before turning to the experience
in ALFs and CCRCs, we briefly discuss aspects of the international
experience of long-term care institutions with the pandemic.

EXPERIENCES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
At least three possible causes of the high death rates in America’s
nursing homes—age, limited privacy, and comorbidities—will be
found in other countries as well. It may be useful to compare the U.S.
experience with that of Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
In the United Kingdom, residents in care homes, which are similar
to U.S. nursing homes, were estimated in 2016 to account for about
4 percent of the population aged 65 years and older, which is about
twice as high as the share of nursing homes in the United States.
Deaths of residents amounted to about 9 percent of the population of
care homes, a figure that is lower than the U.S. share, although obviously still extremely high (see Table 4.1).
In Canada, the death rate of residents in long-term care homes and
other institutions for the elderly are estimated to be about 3 percent
of the population of these institutions.5 The share of deaths of residents in the Canadian equivalent of nursing homes in total COVID-19
deaths is estimated to be 69 percent of total deaths (Canadian Institute
for Health Information 2021), which is much higher than the share
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Table 4.1 Pandemic-Related Nursing Home Deaths in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Canada (March 2020–April 2021)
United
United
States Kingdom Canada Germany
Number of nursing home deaths 150,000
41,521 14,739
29,000
Deaths as a share of home
11.5
8.8
3.4
3.6
residents (%)
Deaths as a share of 65+
0.28
0.35
0.22
0.16
population (%)
Deaths as a share of national
26.5
27.4
69.0
31.4
deaths (%)
Number of nursing home
1,300,000 472,562 428,525 800,000
residents
Population aged 65+
54.07
11.81
6.84
18.09
(in millions)
Total COVID-19 deaths
565,000 151,795 21,361
92,271
NOTE: In the United Kingdom, nursing homes are known as care homes; in Canada,
as long-term care homes.
SOURCE: Canada: number of long-term care home residents is from 2016 census; figure for long-term care homes includes Canadian equivalent of ALFs; 65+ population
is Statistics Canada estimate for July 1, 2020. U.S.: 65+: Census; total and nursing
home deaths CDC; nursing home residents based on state figures. U.K.: National
Health Service for number of residents; MHA.org.uk for percentage of pop. 65+ in
homes. Germany: Population and total deaths: Statista; nursing home residents and
deaths: newspaper reports.

in the United States or the United Kingdom, but this simply reflects
the much higher death rates in the population at large of these two
countries.6
The United Kingdom, like the United States, has vaccinated a
relatively large share of its older population and especially care home
residents. About half the country was partially vaccinated as of early
May 2021, and one-quarter was fully vaccinated. In Canada, although
elderly people have been favored in the distribution of vaccines, vaccination rates were initially much lower than in the United States, in
part because Canada lacks a maker of vaccines. Rates subsequently
recovered as the country obtained more vaccines from abroad, and
because provincial vaccination campaigns have not encountered the
same resistance as they have in the United States. The rate of death
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in German nursing homes, based on the available data, appears to be
similar to the rate in Canada.7
It is impossible to fully understand why the rates of death in nursing homes in the United States and the United Kingdom were so much
higher than in Canada and Germany, but two possible influences
might have been at work. First, the rate of infection in the general
population was much higher in the United States than in other countries, and that was reflected in caregivers’ infection rates and death
rates.8 Second, Medicaid’s means-tested character probably resulted
in U.S. nursing home residents having lower incomes than those in
Canada or Germany. To the extent that income correlates with health,
it could be inferred that comorbidities played a greater role in the
United States than it did in these two countries.

ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES AND CONTINUING
CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES
As Chapter 1 explains, Medicaid requires states to supply substantial information to qualify for eligibility in the program, but the
same does not apply to either ALFs or CCRCs. As a result, the information available on the impact of COVID-19 is extremely limited in
the case of ALFs and basically nonexistent for CCRCs.
A study by the Kaiser Family Foundation in September 2020
reported data on cumulative infection and death rates in ALFs for
19 states through August 2020. Thirty-one states and D.C. were not
reporting cases or deaths in ALFs. Of the 19 reporting states, 10 provided data for both June and August 2020. For the 14 states reporting
through August 2020, cumulative deaths were about 2,600 (True et al.
2020). No information for the subsequent period on cases or deaths
from these states is readily available.
The available data do not permit a calculation of the number of
deaths per ALF resident, although the comparatively low number of
deaths for the 14 reporting states, including California, Connecticut,
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New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas—states that account for a large
share of the population of ALF residents—suggest that it is substantially lower than the rate of death at nursing homes.
Subsequently, New York State began reporting deaths in ALFs,
nursing homes, and other facilities at weekly intervals, with cumulative totals. In the first week of March 2021, deaths in ALFs accounted
for 5 percent of cumulative total deaths in long-term care institutions
of 15,430 (Long-Term Care Community Coalition 2021). Timely and
detailed data for other states do not appear to be readily available. If,
however, the situation in New York may be taken as representative of
the whole country, the conclusion that the death rate among residents
in ALFs is much lower than that at nursing homes is reinforced.
The limited data on CCRCs do not allow any firm conclusion
to be drawn as to the impact of the pandemic on these facilities. It
is likely, however, to have been similar in ALFs, and possibly less
given their more spacious living arrangements. That said, CCRCs do
include facilities for residents who can no longer care for themselves.
To the extent that the living arrangements for these residents are like
nursing homes, similar problems may arise.
In sum, we cannot offer a comprehensive explanation of the
appallingly high death rates in U.S. nursing homes, but the higher
rate of infection in the population at large, which affected the infection and death rates among caregivers, probably played a role. Higher
comorbidity may also have contributed. The higher infection rate in
the population at large was not within the control of nursing homes,
but their response to it was, at least in part.
Notes
1. One very troubling aspect of the COVID-19 pandemic that affects
younger survivors is so-called long COVID: the lingering and often
debilitating side effects of the disease on survivors. See The Economist
(2021).
2. The total number of deaths for which age at death is recorded is about
80 percent of the total number of deaths, apparently because the age
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3.

4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

at death of about one in five victims of COVID-19 could not be determined or was not recorded.
Americans aged 65 and older numbered about 54 million in 2019,
according to the American Community Survey. With an estimated 1.3
million nursing home residents in 2019, the number living outside
homes was about 53 million. If we assume that nursing home residents
are all aged 65+ years, which is a reasonable approximation, COVID-19
related deaths were 0.6 percent of the population aged 65+ outside of
nursing homes.
The death rate of the population less than 65 years old is estimated to be
0.04 percent.
The death rate in Canada is for all congregate facilities, not just for
long-term care (nursing) homes. The rate for nursing homes would be
higher than the rate shown in Table 4.1 if other congregate facilities
were excluded. However, it would remain well below the U.S. rate.
The lower death rate at Canadian institutions does not in any way imply
that the administration in these places has been satisfactory. Picard
(2021) documents some shocking cases of mismanagement and neglect,
including some egregious cases of what amounts to malpractice in one
long-term care home in Montréal.
The figure for Germany shown in Table 4.1 is the sum of estimates for
the German states taken from various sources. It should, therefore, be
considered as representing only an order of magnitude.
The Canadian Institute for Health Information estimates that as of
March 2021, about 25 caregivers had died in Canadian facilities. Even
adjusted for the difference in population between Canada and the United
States, this is a fraction of the number of deaths of caregivers in U.S.
nursing homes.

Chapter 5

Recommendations for Policy

When considering policies for improving long-term care in the

United States, any set of recommendations must be mindful of what
is realistically attainable. Politics is the art of the possible, and as
Voltaire observed, the perfect is the enemy of the good. That said,
it might be useful to set out what a good, if not a perfect, system of
long-term care might look like as a benchmark for reform. Setting a
benchmark is not the same as establishing an edict that must be met
to the letter. It is merely a way of giving reform a coherent and consistent set of objectives and pointing to areas where current practice
is too far from the norm to really be acceptable.
With that in mind, this chapter proceeds with a summary account
of what the author believes a good long-term care system would look
like. It will then draw together the analyses of the chapters that have
preceded it and briefly summarize the ways in which current practice
meets or falls short of this benchmark. Finally, it will make recommendations to bring current practice closer to the norm described
here, setting out three progressively more ambitious approaches to
reform.

A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF A GOOD SYSTEM
A good system should provide at least adequate long-term care
to every citizen who needs it, in an appropriate setting.1 That setting
may be an institution, the person’s home, or a community care center.
The cost of care at home may well be less expensive than institutional
care, although this will depend on the level and nature of care that
each care recipient needs. Persons suffering from severe dementia, for
example, require around-the-clock care, which is much less expen-
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sive if provided in a congregate setting than it would be at home. That
said, some families may have the means to pay for intensive at-home
care and may choose to do so.
Paying for care should not immiserate the care recipient or her
family. The burden of good care on the public purse and therefore on
the taxpayer should be minimized by ensuring that families that can
afford it should pay for all or most of the care, or more generally, that
the role of the public support should vary inversely with the income
or wealth of the care recipient. Except for the very poor, the care
recipient or his family should pay for at least part of his care.
A good system should minimize waste and fraud. To that end,
public support of home care as well as institutional care should be
adequately monitored, which will require that caregiving institutions provide appropriate and timely information on their activities
and their budgets. In addition to adequate information, there must be
incentives in place to effectively minimize poor-quality care or dangerous practices, especially in nursing homes. Monitoring care given
in the home is likely more costly than monitoring institutional care,
because of economies of scale.2
Frontline workers, both skilled and less skilled, should be adequately paid, trained, and vetted. The less-skilled workers in nursing homes, who may have the most contact with residents, need to
be thoroughly trained in procedures that minimize the risk of exposing residents to infections, and understand the importance of helping
more immobile residents to avoid bed sores.
A good system should also be as easy as is feasible given its
inherent complexity for its users, actual and potential, to understand.
Less misunderstanding of the rules that determine who is eligible for
publicly supported care and the terms of those rules will make it easier for everyone to plan for this contingency. Information on publicly
provided care should be published at regular and timely intervals.
Finally, any long-term care system involves politically sensitive
trade-offs between the cost to the taxpayer, the quality of care, and
the financial burden borne by low- and middle-income households.
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Making that trade-off as easy as possible for the country’s political
system to deal with is another critical feature of a good system and
will require that the incentives for efficiency and waste minimization be as well designed as possible. It will also require some general
acceptance of the need for higher taxes, if higher taxes are needed,
to allow the quality and coverage of long-term care to reach a norm.

HOW DOES THE CURRENT SYSTEM COMPARE TO
THE BENCHMARK?
Chapter 3 places the U.S. system in the general category of a residual (i.e., means-tested) system. The U.S. system has the undoubted
merit of being less expensive than the systems of any other advanced
country. However, when compared to the benchmark we have just
outlined, it is deficient in some crucial respects. Of particular concern
are the following shortcomings:
• Coverage and means-testing. Unlike Germany and the Netherlands, where coverage of long-term care is either universal
or nearly so, coverage in the United States is quite severely
limited by means-testing. The result is that many middle-class
families will not be able to avail themselves of it without first
spending down their assets or engaging in estate planning
(which is not cheap) to protect their assets from encroachment. Even then, they may fail their state’s income test. Even
in Canada, where coverage of institutional care or care at home
is not universal, government subsidies bring institutional care
into the reach of most middle-income families. The same is
true of the United Kingdom, as the OECD study described in
Chapter 3 demonstrates. More generally, the U.S. system can
push families to the brink of poverty or require that they care
for their infirm elderly at home when institutional care might
be superior.
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• Care at home. Caregivers at home receive little support from
the government and as a result are often obliged to forgo
remunerated work outside the home. The AARP’s surveys
report significant levels of burnout and psychological stress.
• The provision of timely and comprehensive data. Nursing
homes currently provide comprehensive data, but there is an
unnecessarily long lag in its dissemination. Data on ALFs is
fairly comprehensive in some states, but skimpy or nonexistent in others. It is generally not made available promptly.
Data on CCRCs is almost completely lacking. Regular reporting on care at home understandably does not take place,
although AARP and others have produced very useful and
quite comprehensive surveys of the number of caregivers and
their recipients and other relevant information. This disparity in reporting across congregate institutions mainly reflects
the fact that Medicaid is jointly financed by the federal government and the states, while ALFs and CCRCs are financed
entirely by their residents.
• Understandability. No one who has studied or attempted to
study Medicaid would seriously argue that its rules are easy
to understand. The nature of long-term care would make the
rules that applied to its public provision complex regardless
of any efforts to simplify them. But the combination of the
divided jurisdiction between the federal and state levels of
government and the role of means-testing adds layers of complexity. It is no wonder, as Chapter 2 notes, that a large share
of Americans over the age of 50 are confused about who pays
for what.
• Incentives to rectify shortcomings in care in congregate
facilities. This is almost certainly a more serious problem in
nursing homes than it is in other congregate settings or care
at home. Although nursing homes are required to report deficiencies in the care of their residents to their state by Medic-
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aid, and appear to do so at the required frequency, sanctions
for unhealthy and dangerous practices are rarely invoked.
Although the data available on the impact of the pandemic
in nursing homes or equivalent facilities in other countries is
very limited, what there is makes clear that nursing homes in
the United States were shockingly unprepared to deal with the
risk of contagion and infection. The difference between the
death rates in nursing homes in the United States and those of
its northern neighbor is remarkable, despite the inadequacies
that have been reported in Canada.
• Pay and work conditions of unskilled workers at nursing
homes. Unskilled workers at nursing homes are typically paid
somewhat less than $15 per hour, the wage seen by many as
a minimum living wage. It is questionable whether that rate
is high enough to attract the dedicated workers that the job
demands.

DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
This section sets out three possible approaches to reform of the
current system that would bring it into closer alignment with the
model previously described. The first is the simplest and easiest to
implement, at least from a technical point of view. It would maintain the structure of the status quo while addressing at least in part
what the author believes are the worst failings of the current system.
This first approach, assuming it had political support, would be the
quickest reform to implement, but like the more ambitious versions
that follow, it would require additional taxes to finance it. The second
approach would add some features to the first and would significantly
improve it. It would, however, require yet more taxpayer dollars. The
third approach would require a root and branch reform of the current
system. It would take some time to implement—along with its addi-
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tional cost, it would require enormous political will, and a consensus
that the current system is simply too broken to be fixed.
The First Approach
The first, simplest, and least costly approach would leave the
current financial structure of Medicaid in place. The program would
remain jointly financed by the federal government and the states,
but it would be made more generous by making the means-testing
rules less stringent, both as they apply to custodial care and as they
apply to HCBS. This reform would simply bring public support to
more middle-class families. How much more generous the program
could be would obviously depend on the willingness of taxpayers to
pay more for it. To reduce the effect of moral hazard, the program
might be redesigned with a sliding scale that would eliminate the
strict cut-offs of the current system. The addition of this sliding scale
would be more complex than simply raising the asset and income
tests.3 Another reform, albeit one that would require some change in
the division of responsibility between the two levels of government,
would be to make more uniform the rules that states apply to countable assets, although this might prove to be a bridge too far.
Simply making means-testing less stringent would entail its own
complications. The reader will recall that there are three pathways
to Medicaid eligibility: the original pathway, with an income ceiling
depending on the state of 74 percent or 100 percent of the federal poverty line (which, in the 39 states including D.C. that have accepted the
ACA, is now 138 percent); the special income rule, with a ceiling of
three times the SSI level; and the medically needy rule, the most complex of the three. Raising the limit of the special income rule, which
applies in 42 states and D.C. would be technically straightforward if
politically contentious. The original pathway might be adjusted by a
multiple of its current level in each state, like 1.25. Adjusting the limits of the medically necessary pathway would be the most complex
because of the way the income floor varies from state to state. Similar
considerations would apply to the asset ceiling that states impose.
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One issue that might arise with this first approach, and which
would undoubtedly be politically contentious, is the division of
financing between the federal government and the states. Would the
rules stay the same—a minimum of a 50 percent share and a maximum of a 77 percent share for the federal government, or would there
be substantial pressure for the federal government to pick up more
or even all the extra costs that the reform would entail? Even if the
federal government agreed to increase its share of total costs, disagreement among the states as to what that increased share should
be is quite possible. In sum, even an increase in public support with
the basic structure of Medicaid financing left unchanged would entail
some technical issues that would need to be worked out, and perhaps
more importantly, would be difficult politically.
The Second Approach—The First Approach with an Add-on
The second approach would build on the first by including remuneration for the millions of unpaid relatives and non-family members
who care for the elderly infirm in their homes. A system of payments
to these caregivers is described in the last section of Chapter 2. Payment based on a strict system of periodic reports on the number of
hours spent by caregivers was deemed to be infeasible. Instead, a presumptive system was proposed, where there might be annual inspections of a home where care is being provided and an assumed number
of hours of caregiving assessed. This assessment could be based on
an evaluation of the needs of the care recipient and the number of
persons being cared for in each home. The annual assessment could
be requested by the caregiver or his or her representative and need
not generate much paperwork. In many cases, only one assessment
would be needed, and assessments perhaps would not need to be carried out every year. Remuneration per hour could be some multiple of
the state’s minimum wage.
Even this simplified system for determining what a caregiver
should be paid would pose its own complications. Should the assess-
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ment be done by a trained nurse, as is the case with assessments by
insurance companies that issue long-term care policies when a policyholder initiates a claim? That would require tens or hundreds of thousands of visits in each state, each costing perhaps three or more hours
of a skilled person’s time. Or could a system work if it was based on
an honor system, where it would be enough to show that an elderly
person was living at home and where caregivers made a declaration—which would have to be subject to severe criminal penalties
if it proved to be false—that he or she was in fact providing the care
they claimed?
Another issue would arise with respect to the income of the family undertaking the care and whether it should be considered in determining the remuneration of caregivers. One way to limit costs would
be to place a limit on the income of a caregiving household related to
the number of its members. Under a sliding scale approach, the rate
of hourly remuneration would be phased out as income per household member increased.4 A related issue is whether the hourly income
rate would be determined by the state or by the federal government.
Clearly, the second “add-on” approach would require that additional
technical issues be resolved. More importantly, and while there may
be no point in stating the obvious, political resistance would be considerable because of its extra cost.
The Third Approach—Root and Branch Reform
The third approach would entail a complete overhaul of the current system. Arguably, it would also require a fundamental change
in Americans’ attitudes toward their government and its role in the
economy. The reader does not need reminding that a policy like
Medicare for all has already encountered strong political resistance,
and so would the reform of long-term care described here. The third
approach is offered not as a realistic reform option, but rather as an
ideal that the country might someday wish to pursue. Furthermore,
this account does not presume to be a blueprint, ambitious or otherwise, but a mere sketch of the direction of proposed reform. The
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reader will recognize that the proposal borrows important elements
from the German system described in Chapter 3.
The basic elements of the reform would be universal coverage
with safeguards to ensure that households would contribute toward
the cost of long-term care according to their means. Universal coverage would either be combined with or entail an end to state-bystate regulations and options. Like Medicare, all states would offer
the same coverage. There would be no means-testing, and hence, no
need for state-by-state ceilings on income or assets.5 This aspect of
the reform would have the great virtue of making the system less difficult for the average American to understand and navigate.
The program could be financed from general tax revenues (the
universal model that Chapter 3 describes) or from an addition to
the payroll taxes that now finance Social Security and Medicare
(the social insurance model). Moving to a payroll tax system would
require some adjustment in the taxes levied by the federal government and the states, because it would relieve states of the need to
contribute directly to Medicaid’s costs.
Nursing homes and any other congregate institutions would continue to set prices as they currently do under present arrangements and
would continue to be reimbursed by state governments. However, the
financing source of these payments might change. Under the social
insurance approach, the federal government would make payments
to the states, which would have to either cede part of their tax base to
the federal government or compensate it, at least in part for the extra
expenditure it was undertaking. The same change of arrangements
would need to apply for HCBS.
Residents in subsidized congregate facilities would be expected
to pay the government a charge for their room, board, and maintenance that would be related to their household income. Residents from
households below a certain level would pay nothing, and a sliding
scale would be established for households at higher levels of income.
Care at home could be provided by paid caregivers or professional staff from outside the home, as it now is, or by family members.
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Government could continue to pay caregivers from outside the home
under a HCBS program whose elements would apply to the whole
country, albeit at rates of remuneration that would vary across states.
The government would pay relatives and the other unpaid caregivers who now come to the home of infirm older persons, and as is the
case with institutional care, would establish a sliding scale that would
apply to the total budget each household could allocate to this type of
care, leaving the choice of the source of care in the home up to the
household.6 Caregivers from outside the home would be subject to the
same rates of remuneration that now apply. Relatives and other unpaid
caregivers would be subject to the presumptive scheme described in
Chapter 2.
Medicaid in its present form is largely administered by the states.
The federal government has a critical financing role, which as pointed
out under this reform, would have to change. It also has an indirect
supervisory role of nursing homes, given the reporting requirements
it imposes on states for access to Medicaid financing and the penalties it can impose if the standards it sets for nursing homes and other
congregate facilities it pays for are not met. A change in financial
arrangements might mean that the federal government would lose the
leverage it now has to make states impose adequate standards of care.
This could be avoided if the states remained responsible for paying
nursing homes and were subject to a federal withholding of the funds
they would normally get if they failed in their disciplinary role.
The devil is always in the details, and there are a lot of details
that this broad-brush presentation of a very fundamental reform has
not provided. Moreover, even if the details could all be worked out
perfectly, there is the question of what it would cost. As the section
on unpaid caregivers discussed, paying these workers at rates that
workers in their states receive for similar work would cost about 2
percent of GDP, amounting to about 10 percent of federal government revenues and 6 percent of general government revenues. It is
well beyond the scope of this study to estimate the cost of relaxing
means-testing: for example, the cost of increasing the ceiling under
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the special income pathway from three to four or five times the SSI.
But estimates like these would have to be made.
The epigraph from Pearl Buck at the beginning of the book is
worth pondering when we reflect on the cost of improving the care
that we give to our most vulnerable citizens. Perhaps it would be
well worth the high cost. If this study inspires its readers to take Ms.
Buck’s words seriously, it will have accomplished its basic objective.
Notes
1. This is an ethical judgment, one that cannot be proved or disproved.
A libertarian might posit that persons in need of care or their families should be responsible for the costs of that care, regardless of their
income or wealth level. The definition of “adequate” is a related but separate issue. We might all agree on the need to support the elderly poor
but differ over the quality of that support—the amount of living space
they should have, the quality of the food they eat, and so on. In any case,
if we believe in a societal obligation to support the elderly disabled and
their families, we must reckon with the possible moral hazard that such
support could create: the danger that households will not undertake any
saving to meet the contingencies of old age.
2. There are economies of scale in the sense that with institutionalized
care, those being cared for are under one roof, rather than being separated by possibly long distances.
3. With a sliding scale, the cut-off point of the income test would be raised
with the applicant’s income.
4. Yet another issue relates to the treatment of household members who are
minors—would they count as an adult in numbering the members of a
household? Economists have sometimes assumed that minors should be
counted for less than one adult, on the grounds that their basic expenditure or consumption needs are less.
5. Some functions of government, notably primary and secondary education and policing, are most efficiently carried out at the regional (i.e.,
state) and local levels. Medicare, however, is undoubtedly administered
more efficiently at the federal level, and there is no obvious reason why
its rules should vary from state to state. And if that is true of health
care, it should also be true of long-term care. The same is true of Social
Security. The country does not have 51 Social Security Administrations.
Parenthetically, one might also wonder why it needs 51 separate agencies (the 50 states and D.C.) to administer unemployment insurance.
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6. This assumes that care recipients are either in a facility or are being
cared for at home. If in each budgetary period a care recipient were
receiving care both at an institution and at home, a total budgetary
envelop would apply.
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